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Summary  findings
The internationalization  of financial services - with the further liberalization of capital accounts and
eliminating discrimination  between the treatment  of  domestic deregulation  of financial markets.
foreign and  domestic providers of financial services and  Apart from other benefits, internationalization  helps
removing barriers to the cross-border provision of  build more robust, efficient financial systems by
financial services - is of global interest, especially in  introducing international  practices and standards; by
Asia.  improving the quality, efficiency, and  breadth of
Most of Asia limits the entry of foreign financial firms  financial services; and by allowing more stable sources of
much more than otherwise comparabie countries do.  funds.
Empirical evidence for Asia and elsewhere suggests that  The ongoing WTO negotiation  of financial services
this slows down institutional  development and that, as a  under GATS gives countries the opportunity  to commit
result, it costs more to provide financial services.  to opening their financial sectors. Safeguards can be built
Asian countries could benefit from accelerating the  into the process, and the liberalization can be phased in
opening of the financial services sector, in conjunction  gradually.
This paper - a product of the Economic Policy Division, Poverty Reduction and Economic Managemnent  Network - is
part of a larger effort in the network to study financial reform in developing countries. The paper was written durmg the
summer of 1997,  before the EastAsia financial crisis and before the conclusion of the WTO negotiations in December 1997.
Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NWsV,  Washinigton, DC 20433.  Please contact
Rose Vo, room MC4-404,  telephone  202-473-3722,  fax 202-522-2530,  Internet  address hvol@worldbank.org.  April
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The  internationalization  of  financial  services-eliminating  discrimination  in  treatment
between foreign and  domestic financial services providers and removing barriers to the cross-
border provision  of financial services-is  of global interest, but even more so for developing
Asia. Many Asian countries limit entry of foreign financial firms much more than comparably
developed  countries.  Asian countries are considering the issue of (further) opening up in the
context of their general financial sector reform strategies and the Financial Service Agreement
currently being negotiated under the GATS.  This paper reviews the conceptual and empirical
case  for  further  opening up,  studies  the  relationships  between the  openness  of eight  Asian
financial markets and their institutional development and costs of financial services provision,
and derives a number of policy implications.
Internationalization relates to the degree of capital account liberalization as it determines the
potential  gains  and  benefits  from  access to  foreign financial  services provided  domestically
relative to access provided and obtained off-shore.  Internationalization also relates to domestic
financial deregulation as the degree of regulation influences the quality and competitiveness of
domestic financial services providers.  A review of experiences suggest that almost independent
of the state of development of the domestic  financial system and the openness of the capital
account,  internationalization  can  help  in  the  process  of  building  more robust  and  efficient
financial systems by introducing international practices and standards, by improving the quality,
efficiency and breadth of financial services, and by allowing more stable sources of funds.  Given
the state of development of many Asian financial systems, these institutional benefits could be
substantial.  The review of experiences also finds very little support for the notion that foreign
entry leads to more volatile capital flows or more difficult monetary policy management.
Cross-country empirical evidence for Asia specifically suggests that the limited openness to
date  has  been  costly  in  terms  of  higher  costs  of  financial  services,  slower  institutional
development and more fragile financial systems.  For eight Asian countries, the costs of financial
services and the fragility of the financial systems are negatively related to the degree of openness
of the domestic market to foreign financial firms.  The efficiency of financial services provision
and the institutional development of the financial sector are positively related to openness.
The review  of evidence generally and  for Asia  specifically suggest that,  going  forward,
Asian countries could substantially benefit from accelerating the opening up of their financial
systems,  in  conjunction  with  further  capital  account  liberalization,  domestic  financial
deregulation, and a strengthening of the supervisory and regulatory framework and the role of the
market  in  monitoring  financial institutions. The ongoing  financial service negotiations at the
WTO  provides  countries  with  the  opportunity  to  commit  to  this  opening  up,  with  built-in
safeguards and the possibility  of phasing in  to minimize the possible  adjustment costs.  This
commitment  can be  an  important  part  of  a  country's  overall  financial  sector  development
strategy, for which, given the regional financial turbulence, there may be a large premium today.1.  INTRODUCTION
Many developing countries are assessing whether domestic financial-service sectors should
be opened to foreign competition and, if so, how. Governments are interested in the questions of
how fast to open up, in the design of policies to minimize transition costs and potential risks and
maximize  the  benefits  to  their  economies  of  increased  openness,  and  in  the  required
complementary policy measures.  Countries in Asia have a special interest in this topic as many
countries to date are closed compared to similar countries.
Introducing foreign competition in financial-services has come up as part of overall financial
sector reform  programs  or  in the  context  of regional  trade  agreements.  More recently,  the
(resumed) negotiations on  financial services in  the General Agreement  on  Trade in  Services
(GATS), with a deadline of December 1997, have created another impetus to consider this issue
as it involves countries making commitments to open their financial-service markets.  And, as
countries continue to review their policies towards foreign competition in their financial sector,
internationalization will remain an important issue for the foreseeable future.
Analysis in this relatively new policy area requires an investigation of several related issues:
(a)  a conceptual framework regarding the benefits and potential risks of (alternative ways of)
opening domestic financial-service sectors to foreign competition (where such competition can
take a variety of forms), the relationships of internationalization of financial services with capital
account  liberalization  and  domestic  financial  sector  deregulation,  and  the  complementary
domestic policy measures and time-path needed to obtain the maximum benefits and minimum
costs from opening up;
(b)  the costs of providing financial services and the relationships between costs, the structure of
domestic financial systems and related supporting infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications), and
the barriers to entry by foreign financial services providers (FSPs); and
(c)  the  relationships  between  internationalization and  the allocation  of resources  in  and the
performance of the real economy (e.g., the links between a country's competitiveness  and the
degree of openness of its financial sector).
The purpose of this paper is to review these questions for eight Asian countries.  Section 2
provides the motivation and context.  Section 3 reviews the relationship among various financial
reforms,  while  sections  4  and  5  review  the  conceptual  issues  and  the  experiences  with
internationalization to date.  Sections 6, 7 and 8 respectively provide measures of the costs of
financial services, the structure of financial systems, the institutional development and the degree
of internationalization in eight Asian countries.  Section 9 relates measures of financial  sector
efficiency, costs of financial sector provision, institutional development and fragility with the
degree  of  openness  for  different  financial  services.  The  concluding  section  discusses  the
economic and financial policy implications of a process of further internationalization for Asia.2
2.  MOTIVATION AND CONTEXT
Global  trends  in  recent  years  include  a process  of  more rapid financial  integration  and
increased cross-border capital flows.  Most Asian countries have actively participated in these
trends  and the bulk of private capital flows to developing countries has gone to Asia (World
Bank,  1997a and  1997b).  In recent years, Asian countries have also been in the process  of
deregulating  their  financial  systems, albeit at different  speeds,  and allowing  more  access of
foreign  investors  and  financial  service providers  (FSPs) to  their  domestic  markets.  Table  1
positions the eight Asian countries of study in this paper in some of these dimensions.  The table
shows  that  these  Asian  countries  are  highly  financially  integrated  and  have  experienced
significant amounts of private capital inflows, much of it in recent years.  While the share of
domestic financial assets held by foreign-owned banks is relatively small, the share of foreign
investors in stock market trading is quite large, with Indonesia the highest.  Singapore's cross-
border trade  in  insurance services is the highest among these countries, but in  general  these
countries are not important exporters of financial services (as also reflected in the relatively small
number of foreign branches of banks from these countries and the fact that many foreign firms
established in these countries continue to use services from foreign banks).
Other  global developments also  affect Asian  financial systems.  Negotiation  of a  WTO
agreement on international trade and investment in financial services-a  post-Uruguay Round
supplement to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)-was  completed at the end
of July,  1995.  Most WTO members, but not the US, accepted the result.'  Instead of a final
agreement,  the  offers  of  other  countries  in  the  negotiation  were  therefore  codified  into  an
"interim agreement", and negotiations resumed in April  1997 with a date for completion of a
final agreement set as of the end of 1997.  Asian countries and other developing countries must
therefore  consider even more  so their interests in opening their financial services markets to
international competition in the context of their overall financial sector development strategies.
Although there are differences among Asian countries and their financial sector openness, a
regional  focus  is useful.  While  Asian  countries show  a  high  degree  of  financial  depth  as
reflected in the ratios to GDP of broad money, total banking assets, and private credit, relative to
countries  at  their  income  levels,  many  Asian  countries  still  have  still  quite  regulated  and
institutionally  under-developed  financial  sectors  (Claessens  and  Glaessner,  1997).?  Asian
' The stumbling block for the U.S. was the obligation of signatories to the financial-services agreement (FSA) to
provide  most-favored-nation  (MFN)  treatment  to  other  signatories-which  implies  that  services  and  service
providers from countries with closed markets for financial services must be treated in the same way as services and
service providers from members with open markets.  The U.S. was unwilling to accept this obligation when, in its
view, the market access commitments of a number of developing-country participants were such that their markets
for financial services in effect remained closed. The US, though,  is not the only source of such pressure.  Other
developed  countries want  US membership  of the  WTO financial-services agreement,  and will attempt to  create
circumstances  in which  the  US will join.  The EU in particular, which  took the  lead in arranging  the  interim
agreement, is clear about its hope for a final agreement that is acceptable to the US.
2  There are many forces already  underway which put pressures on governments in the region to further  liberalize
and develop their domestic financial sectors: rapid changes in the real economies associated with high growth rates,
including much more formalization and changes in the form of the  corporate governance of  firms (with a  move
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countries also have relatively closed financial systems and Asian commitments to GATS were
quite restrictive relative to the level of development of their financial sectors (Sorsa, 1997). And
in terms of actual openness (as measured by the share of foreign assets in total banking assets),
Asian countries, with the exception of Singapore and Hong Kong, rank low among emerging
markets.  These common features, and intra-regional deliberations regarding financial services
(in APEC and ASEAN), 3 warrant a regional focus.
3.  INTERNATIONALIZATION  AND OTHER FINANCIAL  REFORMS
There  are important linkages between  internationalization  of financial  services  and two
other financial reforms: domestic financial  deregulation, and capital account liberalization. In
addition,  there  are  important  relationships  between  internationalization  and  the  conduct  of
monetary policy.
4 A definition of these three types of financial reform is as follows. Domestic
financial  deregulation  allows market  forces to  work by eliminating controls  on  lending and
deposit rates and on credit allocation, by reducing demarcation lines between different types of
financial service firms (such as banks, insurance companies, stockbrokers), and more generally
by reducing the role of the state in the domestic financial system. Capital account liberalization
involves a process  of removal of capital controls and restrictions on the convertibility  of the
currency.  Internationalization  of  financial  services  eliminates  discrimination  in  treatment
between  foreign and  domestic financial services providers and removes barriers to  the cross-
border provision of financial services.
Internationalization  and domestic financial deregulation The effects of deregulation of
domestic financial markets has been an important policy issue for developing countries for some
time.  In the  last decade,  many countries in Asia  have gradually  deregulated their  financial
markets.  The relationships between financial-market liberalization and economic development
have been extensively explored; the results,  including for Asia,  indicate that  liberalization  of
financial systems is a major factor in economic development, but needs to be carefully sequenced
and managed (Caprio et al, 1994 and Levine, 1997).  In particular, experience shows that it is
vital  to strengthen the supporting institutional framework, i.e., the regulatory and  supervisory
functions of the state (including the screening of the entry of new financial firms) and the use of
the market in disciplining financial institutions (especially through better information and greater
disclosure, and improved standards for the governance of financial institutions).
away from family-control  and other forms of (social)  controls to more formal corporate  governance  mechanisms,
including  through securities  markets);  large long-term  financing  needs,  especially  for infrastructure  (power, roads,
telecommunications,  etc.) and housing,  which can not be met by banking systems;  and other domestic  pressures,
including  a growing  middle-class  seeking  a wider range of financial  services.  These issues are further discussed  in
Claessens  and Glaessner,  1997.
3  Such as the ASEAN Framework  Agreement  on Services, adopted December 15, 1995, which envisions free
regional  trade in goods and services  in 2020.
4  See  Glaessner and  Oks  (1994) that  highlight these links in  the  context of  discussing the  impact of
internationalization under NAFTA.4
Internationalization  and  domestic  deregulation  are  related,  but  not  in  any  easy  or
straightforward way.  Neither, for example, implies the other.  A country might deregulate its
financial  system but still keep its financial markets closed to  foreign competition.  Japan,  for
example, has been deregulating its domestic financial system, but  is still often singled out  by
other  developed  countries  as  being relatively  closed to  foreign FSPs.  Or  a  country  might
over-regulate its domestic markets for financial services, but freely allow foreign financial firms
to  open  local  establishments  and  to  compete  with  domestic  FSPs  within  that  system  of
regulation.  Banking  in  the  US,  for example,  is  often criticized  as  over-regulated,  yet  US
financial-service markets are very open to foreign FSPs. 5
But the costs and benefits of internationalization of financial services will to a significant
degree depend on the efficiency and competitiveness of the domestic financial system, which in
turn will importantly be influenced by the nature of domestic regulation.  Countries with a highly
regulated domestic  financial system may well suffer from inefficiencies and poor quality  and
breadth of financial services.  Opening up to FSPs may then-in  the short run-negatively  affect
domestic FSPs, not necessarily because foreign FSPs have unfair advantages (see further below),
but because FSPs have been hindered in their development through regulations, have faced little
competition,  and  have  faced perverse  incentives.  At  the  same time,  countries  with  poorly
developed financial systems may benefit the most  in the long run from opening up as it can
accelerate financial sector development.
Internationalization  and  capital  account liberalization  Many  countries,  including  in
Asia,  have  relaxed  controls  on  international  capital  movements  in  recent  years,  and  have
experienced significant capital inflows, and more recently net capital outflows. 6 Research has
generally found that reducing controls on international capital movements can lead to lower costs
of capital  and greater risk  diversification (see Dooley  1996 for a  review of the  literature  on
capital controls). The quality of the financial system, however, is a central factor.  Countries with
weak  financial  systems,  particularly  in  terms  of  supervision,  have  sometimes  experienced
financial distress following a period of rapid inflow of foreign capital associated with the earlier
removal of controls on international capital movements (Honohan, 1997a, Goldstein and Turner,
1996, Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez, 1993, World Bank, 1997a).
Internationalization and capital account liberalization are related, but not in an obvious way.
With an open capital account, equities issued in a developing-country market, for example, might
be largely traded in New York in the form of an American Depository Receipt-but  perhaps still
owned by co-nationals of the original issuer.  Or domestic firms may avail themselves of off-
' Even when countries deregulate, important differences in regulatory systems are likely to remain and influence the
degree of competition  in financial services when countries  open up.  Japan and the US, for example, maintain
significant legal separation between commercial and investment banking.  Banks and insurance companies are also
kept separate for most purposes in these two countries.  See further below.
6  Capital account liberalization  is a process and individual  countries can be in different phases of this process
ranging from fully controlled capital account to fully open.  Asian countries span this range with China and India
being quite controlled  to Hong Kong being fully  open. Even  though  being closed  on the capital  account,  China has
received  large  amounts  of capital  flows,  mainly  in the form  of foreign  direct  investment.5
shore financial  services: many Asian firms, for example, borrow abroad-and  then  repatriate
funds in  domestic  currency for local use.  Such cases  involve both  the movement  of capital
across borders and the use of foreign financial services, without the entry of foreign financial
firms.
The  degree  of  capital  account  liberalization  can  affect  the  costs  and  benefits  of
internationalization.  First, capital account liberalization affects the incentives of foreign FSPs to
establish  presence  in the country, as opposed to  servicing clients from  off-shore  (which can
include seeking business to be done off-shore through representative offices on-shore).  Second,
it determines the extent to which classes  of domestic firms and individuals  can already  avail
themselves of foreign financial services. Typically, as is the case for many Asian countries, with
(largely) free capital mobility the largest and best credit firms and individuals will have access to
foreign  markets  and  internationally  provided  financial  services,  while  smaller  and  less
creditworthy firms and individuals will be confined to the domestic market. Third, it can imply
varying costs across different users of financial services in the event of a financial crisis.  If some
of the cost of a financial crisis are passed on to the rest of the domestic economy (either through
direct bailouts of corporates or support to financial institutions), 7 then segmentation will (further)
hurt  other  firms  and  consumers.  Fourth,  segmentation  can affect  the political  economy  of
internationalization. Internationalization allows benefits for a wide class of firms and individuals,
but  firms  and  individuals  which  currently  already have  access to  foreign financial  services
(provided off-shore) may be indifferent to internationalization.  If those who do not have access
to  foreign  financial  service are politically  less  well-represented, then  the political  economy
outcome could be a continuation of barriers to foreign FSPs.
Some  degree  of  free  capital  movement  will  be  necessary  for  effective  and  efficient
internationalization.  Some types of foreign (and domestic) FSPs need to be able to move capital
across borders relatively freely to conduct their business efficiently.  With limits on some forms
of capital movements, distortions can easily be introduced.  But, again, neither liberalization of
the capital account nor internationalization is a precondition for the other.  Capital might move
relatively freely in and out of a country that maintains barriers against foreign firms providing
financial  services  domestically.  Many  financial  markets  in  Asia  are  still  quite  closed  to
international  competition  in  financial  services,  even  though  these  same  economies  have
substantially relaxed their controls on capital movements in recent years.  Chile, on the other
hand, is quite open to foreign FSPs but maintains some controls on cross-border movements of
capital.  The key factor determining the optimal speed of capital account liberalization, however,
appears to be the quality of the overall financial system, with the degree of internationalization
more important indirectly-in  terms of influencing the quality of the financial system-than  in
terms of directly affecting the optimal degree of capital account liberalization.
'  In particular,  much of access  to international  financial  services  will be denominated  in foreign  currency.  This may
create  large currency mismatches, which in the event of a devaluation, can lead to large foreign exchange losses
which can be passed on to other segments of the economy.6
Internationalization  and  monetary  policy The  conduct  of monetary  policy,  including
exchange  rate  management,  may be  affected by the  degree of  internationalization.  Foreign
financial  firms  may  introduce  new  financial  instruments, which  may  affect  the  behavior  of
money demand and make monetary management more difficult, particularly in countries which
so far have relied more on direct monetary policy instruments. Concerns about the behavior of
foreign  banks  in  the  host  country  moving  capital  rapidly  across  borders  have  also  been
mentioned.  And the presence of foreign banks may allow firms and individuals to move funds
more easily in and out of the country.  This could make monetary policy more difficult as well as
create  opportunities  for  (more)  private  capital  outflows  ("capital  flight").  Many  of  these
concerns  relate  to  financial  innovation  and  monetary  management  more  generally,  but
internationalization can be expected to expand the class of instruments and the number of firms
and  individuals  engaged  (directly  or  indirectly)  in  more rapid  asset  substitution,  including
through capital account transactions.
Internationalization  also  raises  important issues  regarding the  taxation  of  (cross-border)
provision of financial services.  Some developing countries still impose heavy direct and indirect
taxes on their  financial system, including through  reserve requirements.  Internationalization,
however, can imply larger cross-border capital flows which will be more difficult to tax.  When
the tax system is not rationalized, asymmetries and distortions can also more easily arise with
internationalization.  The process of  internationalization forces thus  a need  for  lowering the
taxation of the financial system and reforming the taxation of financial services.
Complex  Relationships  The  relationships  between  internationalization,  domestic
deregulation, capital account liberalization and monetary policy are thus complex (Glaessner and
Oks,  1994, provide a more extensive discussion; see also WTO,  1997).  At present, a tightly
defined theoretical and conceptual structure for analyzing the impact of these related issues is
still missing and empirical evidence is only starting to become available.  It is thus too difficult
to discuss issues such as the optimal speed and other relationships between the three types of
reform.  It  appears, however,  that  there  is not  a  unique  optimal sequence  to  these  reforms:
experiences as diverse as  Indonesia (rapid capital account  liberalization  followed by gradual
internationalization),  Chile  (slower  capital  account  liberalization  but  more  rapid
internationalization) and the US (slower deregulation in the provision of financial services by
different types of financial firms, but  free entry) show very different approaches but no clear
differences in  impact (in terms of, for example, efficiency and  enhancing competitiveness  of
banking system, speed of financial reform, or more generally, economic welfare). 8
There  also  does  not  appear  to  be  an  obvious  optimal  sequence  for  a  given  level  of
development.  In a low-income country with good growth prospects, but with a poorly developed
financial services industry, for example, there are many reasons to  expect that  opening up to
foreign FSPs will lead not only to improved financial services, but also to a more stable capital
B It will be difficult to explain separately the effects of these financial reform processes for a certain country.  Even
in stable, developed countries it has been difficult or impossible to assess the impact of various financial systems (in
current use or even in recent history) on the economies.7
account. 9 In  a  middle-income  country  with  a  highly-developed  financial  system,  but  with
significant non-performing assets, however, internationalization may well need to be phased to
deal with the adjustment costs.  Any approach, of course, needs to be internally consistent and
the  various  reform  processes  need  to  be  supported  by  a  strengthening  of  the  institutional
framework for the financial sector.
The relationships between the various reform processes may also differ by type of financial
services.  Non-life insurance services (e.g., motor insurance) and many other consumer financial
services,  for  example,  have  mostly non-financial  services' characteristics:  they  involve,  for
example, few investable funds.  They thus have fewer linkages with capital account liberalization
and  monetary  policy,  and  internationalization  of  these  services  might  proceed  more
independently of other financial reform processes.  The high degree of substitutability between
the various financial services (for example, life-insurance contracts can have features equivalent
to bank deposits), however, make a refined differentiation for other services difficult in practice
and possibly unproductive.
4.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND COST AND BENEFITS
The starting point for the study of internationalization of financial services is whether the
theory  of  comparative  advantage  and  the  empirical  evidence  on  the  benefits  of  openness
developed for trade in goods applies to trade in services. The general conclusion of research on
this topic is that the broad conclusions of comparative-advantage theory hold also for services-
and thus that internationalization of services has large potential benefits for developing countries
as  they  are comparatively  less well-endowed-but  require modification  in  the  detail  of the
analysis to take account of the differences between goods and services (see Hindley, 1  996a for a
review).  Internationalization of financial services, however, is a much more recent field of study
and has been studied much less systematically.'" Most of the papers in this area are also based on
first principles often derived from the analogy with liberalization of trade in goods (and only to a
very limited degree on empirical evidence)."
9  In this  respect, it is useful to  recall that in the  past many developing  and  now developed  countries'  financial
systems were  dominated by foreign FSPs without apparent adverse affects on financial  flows.  Under the  gold-
standard and further back in time, financial services were transacted through a  limited number of internationally
operating FSPs or individuals (e.g., the Rothshilds of the world).
'° Sagari,  1988,  1989, discusses  internationalization of  financial services specifically and  derives the  result that
skilled labor can be the source of comparative advantage in the production of financial services.  Gelb and Sagari,
1990, discuss the  case of multilateral negotiations in financial services specifically.  They argue that developing
countries should open their borders to foreign competition, but at a moderate pace.  Several other papers have made
the general conceptual case for internationalization of financial services (Walter and Gray,  1983, Walter, 1987 and
1993, UNCTAD, 1994, and Levine, 1996).  Glaessner and Oks, 1994 and Musalem et al. 1994 present a case in the
context of NAFTA; WTO, 1997 reviews the literature and issues as well.
" One exception  is Moshirian,  1994,  who shows  empirically  for 13 OECD  countries  that  the supply  of international
financial  services depends  on  national  R&D,  banks'  international assets  and  physical  and  human  capital,  thus
suggesting that comparative advantages are important in the delivery of financial services.8
International transactions in goods and international transactions in services-especially  in
financial services-differ,  however, in two important ways from other forms of trade which need
to be taken into account.  First, provision of services often requires the provider of the services to
have a local presence.  Efficient provision of financial products often requires information that is
difficult to obtain from a foreign location-detailed  information to tailor loans or other financial
services  to  client  characteristics,  for  instance,  or  the  ability  to  offer  advice  that  requires
knowledge  of  local  conditions.  If  financial  services  are  "imported"  through  the
locally-established branch or subsidiary of a foreign FSP, then local firms can only be protected
against  competition by entry barriers.  Other forms of barriers (e.g., higher taxes  on foreign
financial services) will then not be a equivalent measure, as tariffs can be in the case of trade.
Because  trade  in  services  is more  difficult to  observe  and  monitor,  regulators  may actually
require  domestic  presence  to  ensure  that  they maintain  control  (many countries  do  so,  for
example, for the solicitation of insurance services)." 2
Second, the provision of financial services is typically highly regulated, for both  fiduciary
and for monetary-policy  purposes.  The case for such regulation is universally accepted and is
not  at  issue  when  it  comes to  the  internationalization  (for  example,  under  the  WTO  any
prudential measure is explicitly excluded).  Regulation, however, affects the cost of providing a
service.  Hence, when  FSPs subject to  one set of regulations  compete with  FSPs  subject to
another, one element in the outcome of the competition is the relative cost of complying with the
different regulatory  systems.  Differences in regulations between countries may thus affect-
fairly or unfairly-competition  in trade of services across borders as well as the local provision
of  financial  services by  foreign  (regulated) firms.' 3 And  undue  regulations  risk  of  course
distortions and may limit the efficiency gains of entry by foreign financial firms.
Benefits The main conclusion of the conceptual papers is that, as the removal of barriers to
trade  in  goods  allows  for  specialization  according  to  comparative  advantage  and  can  lead
formerly-protected producers to improve their efficiency, so can foreign involvement in markets
for financial services lead to  an improvement in the overall functioning of domestic financial
systems.  Levine,  1996,  who  surveys  these  issues  and  the  existing  literature  on
internationalization,  identifies  three  specific  potential  benefits:  (a)  better  access  to  foreign
capital;  (b) better domestic  financial services; and  (c) better domestic  financial infrastructure
(including improved regulation and supervision), with the last two the most important benefits of
internationalization for developing countries (Glaessner and Oks, 1994, provide a similar account
in the context of NAFTA).
2  The advent of electronic provision of financial services (e.g., through the Internet) has brought this to the
forefront not only in the cross-border  provision of financial services, but also within countries (e.g., see the
discussion  in the US on the use of electronic  money).
13  On this basis, it is said that  national  markets for financial  services cannot be  internationalized until  national
regulatory  systems  have been harmonized. An alternative  view is that international  competition  will put pressures
on regulators  to deregulate,  and possibly  harmonize,  and that internationalization  should not be held hostage to
attempts  to harmonize. This  latter  view can be found  in Glaessner  and Oks, 1994,  and William  White, 1  996a.9
The specific benefits that countries might expect in these last two areas include: a  more
efficient financial  sector; a broader range and improved quality of (consumer) services; better
human  skills;  pressures for  improved regulation and  supervision, better  disclosure  rules  and
general  improvements  in  the  legal  and  regulatory  framework  for the  provision  of  financial
services; improved credibility of rules  (as the country enters into international agreements and
intensifies linkages with foreign regulators, thereby lowering the risk of policy reversals); and a
reduction in  (systemic) risks and improvements in  (stock market)  liquidity. These benefits of
internationalization  can follow both through top-down actions on the part of government  and
through bottom-up pressures from the markets as best international practices and experiences are
introduced and competitive pressure increases.
As in other sectors, openness to foreign competition allows consumers to obtain better and
more appropriate services more cheaply and puts pressure on domestic financial firms to improve
their productivity and services.  It also allows financial firms access to technologies and ideas to
help them  raise efficiency.  Opening up can thus help countries build up an export sector in
financial services, an expressed desire of some Asian countries. Internationalization will also put
pressures  on  improved  supervision  by  authorities  of  domestic  financial  institutions.  The
presence of foreign FSPs can further help improve the screening of projects and monitoring  of
firms, thus leading to a better financial system.  The most important benefits of an open financial
system will likely stem from the positive spill-over effects on savings and investments and on the
allocation  of productive  resources,  which  would translate  into positive  effects  on  economic
growth.  The general relevance of a good financial system for growth" 4 and the mechanisms
through which this occurs are well established (see Levine, 1997 for a review).
Costs Specific evidence on the costs of internationalization is needed once one considers the
relationship  between internationalization and deregulation.  Deregulation suggests a desire to
improve the efficiency of the system; but,  if that is the objective, why exclude  international
competition?  In  other type  of  industries, international  competition  is  regarded  as  the  best
guarantee that  domestic producers  are, and remain,  efficient. The  answer to  this  asymmetry
between domestic deregulation and  internationalization mainly relates to the desirable relative
speed of internationalization and lies in both economic and political economy arguments.
Economic  arguments  Economic arguments  against  rapid internationalization  are  based
upon adjustment costs.  Costs often mentioned are the following.  First, the ability of domestic
institutions to monitor a more complex financial system may be limited (as a consequence of, for
example, a poor legal framework, a lack of the skills needed for supervision, and poor market
discipline).  In  the light  of such problems, too  rapid internationalization may  lead to  larger
(systemic) risks as foreign FSPs can not be supervised and monitored  properly.  Related, the
governent  may  lack  credibility  in  enforcing  prudential  regulations  and  withdrawing  an
4  In a seminal piece of work, King and Levine, 1993, use a cross-country  sample of 80 cases over the period
1960-1989 to show clear and convincing links between growth and finance and also to provide strong evidence that
better developed  finance  precedes faster growth, after controlling  for a variety  of other factors (including  income,
education,  political  stability,  and monetary,  fiscal,  trade and  exchange  rate policies).10
(implicit) insurance scheme, and as a consequence it is reluctant to reduce controls on financial
system and open up to foreign entry as it expects that liberalization will lead to excessive risk-
taking at the final expense of the government.  Also significant participation of foreign banks in a
country's payment system has been argued to possibly lead to adverse effects.
Second, in cases where the financial system is currently undercapitalized, rapid entry could
lead to  (more) financial  distress among domestic FSPs  as profits  decline.  In particular,  the
presence in the banking system of large non-performing loans may require policies to maintain
higher profits (higher franchise value) for existing banks, and therefore call for restrictions on the
entry of new banks (both domestic and foreign)." 5 Third, regulatory advantages possessed by
foreign  banks,  which  could  make  competition  between  domestic  and  foreign  banks  unfair,
especially as emerging markets have special features.  It might, for example, be useful to impose
more stringent regulatory requirements in emerging markets than those imposed in more advance
economies (due, for example, to the higher risks faced).  Admitting financial firms chartered and
supervised in other countries would then create an unlevel playing field from the standpoint of
domestic  financial  institutions.  And fourth,  the infant  industry  argument  for  protection,  and
relatedly possible adverse effects on domestic labor in the financial sector, have been mentioned.
Many of the arguments mentioned, even if valid, do not necessarily require limiting entry to
foreign FSPs (or limiting the cross-border provision  of financial services), or  at least do not
require considering domestic deregulation and internationalization separately.  The presence of
large, non-performing loans, for example, can in principle be dealt with through restructuring of
individual  financial  institutions  or  through  specific  taxes  on  financial  services,  rather  than
through limiting entry.  The infant industry argument against international competition has been
tested  and  found  wanting when liberalization of trade  in  goods is at issue.  Even where  its
premises can be  shown to provide a valid basis for intervention, it is easy to  show that other
forms of intervention are economically superior to barriers to imports  An unlevel playing  field
could  be  corrected by  requiring  foreign financial  firms  to  observe  the  same  regulations  as
domestic financial firms, i.e., national treatment.  The integrity of the payments systems can be
assured by adopting clear rules on the quality and integrity of financial institutions which  can
participate.  And the effect of internationalization on domestic labor is likely to  be limited as
relatively  little  labor  is  employed  by  the  financial  sector,  especially  in  Asian  developing
countries, as foreign FSPs will tend to employ nationals when they establish local presence and
as, in any case, the effect is no more so than for labor from other sectors experiencing efficiency
gains.
These economic arguments do not apply similarly to all financial services.  While there may
be  a case  for  gradual internationalization  of  some bank-based financial  services, this  is not
necessarily the  case for some  of the  other non-bank-based financial  services. There  are few
economic reasons why for example, non-life insurance services (e.g., car insurance) would have
Is Similar arguments  are used for other type of financial  services,  for example, insurance. The issue is not the
relevance of franchise  value for financial  sector stability,  reviewed  by Caprio and Summers, 1993,  but rather the
aim to shore up a financial  sector  through  restricting  entry  excessively  instead  of encouraging  exit and restructuring.I1
negative effects on financial sector stability and thus can not be internationalized rapidly.  These
services have few linkages to monetary policy and rules to assure consumer protection, rather
than prudential regulation, will be important.  Furthermore, since these services tend to be less
developed in most developing countries, opening up will have little negative effects on domestic
FSPs.
Political  economy  arguments  International competition,  it  is  said,  will  eliminate  local
FSPs, and thus leave the domestic financial system at the mercy of foreigners.  Furthermore, it is
claimed,  foreign banks  will  operate  only  in  very  profitable market  segments;  will have  no
commitment to the local market, and may contribute to capital flight.  International competition
must therefore be regulated, impeded and limited.  These arguments are mainly put forward by
interested parties standing to lose from opening up.  As in the case of trade reform, e.g., tariff
reductions, there will be fierce opposition by interested parties to opening up (which sometimes
may  include  foreign  financial  firms  already  established).  In  part,  the  political  economy
arguments also arise from the notion that foreign domination of the domestic financial system
must be avoided.  National security and cultural integrity demand barriers to foreign competition.
The validity of these arguments is subject to debate.  Most importantly, it should be clear
that openness to foreign competition puts pressure on domestic financial firms to improve their
productivity and services which is beneficial.  Furthermore, the goal of authorities cannot be to
maintain all financial institutions at all times: system stability rather than individual stability is
what matters, and the exit of insolvent financial institutions is a necessary discipline.
Nevertheless,  if  there  is  to  be  intervention  to  ensure  the  survival  of  local  FSPs-for
economic or political reasons, the question needs to be answered whether alternative means of
ensuring the survival of local FSPs exist and which of these is preferable?  The analysis of trade
has  come  up  with  some  means which  are more efficient than simply  restricting trade,  e.g.,
subsidies  to  local  firms  or  taxes on  foreign firms,  or, if  there  are to  be  entry barriers,  the
auctioning of licenses.  In principle, more efficient instruments could also be used temporarily in
the  case of financial services, with  a view  of eventually eliminating them.'6 But  temporary
measures can have disadvantages which, similarly to the case of trade, largely stem from moral
hazard and political economy reasons.  Temporary subsidies to local FSPs may in principle allow
them  to  prepare  themselves  to  face  international competition,  but  they  can  become  a  too
powerful additive which  can no  longer be taken  away. These risks appear to  be  larger  with
financial firms than with manufacturing firms and providers of other type of services as there
often will be a greater (explicit or implicit) safety net alread,y provided by the government for
FSPs, making withdrawal of support in the future even less credible.  Auctions may not attract
16 Under  the GATS-rules,  laws and regulations  may be applied  differently  to foreign  FSPs, provided  that their effect
is equivalent  in granting  de facto national  treatment  and does not place foreign  FSPs at a competitive  disadvantage
in the  host country market. And  GATS allows of course countries to  schedule derogations from market
access/national  treatment. If a country  has quantitative  restrictions  and has made an exception  for them, it can
therefore maintain  differences  in treatment  between  foreign and domestic  FSPs (see further Hoekman  and Sauve,
1994).12
the  best  qualified  bidders  in  case of  financial  services  as  there  is  more  room  for  adverse
selection. 7
5.  REVIEW OF EXPERIENCES WITH INTERNATIONALIZATION
Benefits  Until  recently,  there  were  only  a  few  studies  on  the  costs  and  benefits  of
internationalization  of financial services.  Bhattacharya, 1993, surveys experiences in Pakistan,
Turkey and South Korea and finds that foreign banks helped to make foreign capital accessible to
fund  domestic projects. Pigott,  1986, reviews the experiences of  nine Pacific  Basin countries
specifically  and  provides  some  aggregate  statistics  on the  size  and  scope  of  foreign  banks
activities.  He  finds  that  while  foreign  banks  rely  more  than  domestic  banks  on  foreign
borrowing, foreign banks still fund more than 3/4 of their domestic loans from domestic sources.
McFadden,  1994 provides  a study of the effect of removal of restrictions  on foreign FSPs  in
Australia and finds that this has led to improved domestic bank  operations.  Using aggregate
accounting data for  14 developed  countries, Terell, 1986, finds that countries  which allowed
foreign bank entry had lower gross interest margins, lower before-tax profits and lower operating
costs (all scale by the volume of business).  There have also been some studies on the potential
impact  of  regional  trade  agreements (which  comprise major  internationalization  of  financial
services), most notably for the EU, EU/Price Waterhouse, 1988.)
Now,  specific  empirical  evidence  of  the  benefits  of  internationalization  is  starting  to
accumulate,  particularly  on  the  ex-post  impact  of  opening  up  in  the  context  of  regional
agreements (Honohan, 1995, on the effects in Ireland, Portugal, and Greece; Honohan, 1997b, on
Portugal, and Greece; Vasala, 1995, EU, 1997, Gardener, Molyneux and Moore, 1997, and other
related papers  on the  effects in  the EU; Nicholl,  1997, on New Zealand;  Arriazu,  1997 on
Argentina;  Pastor, Perez, and Quesala, 1997, on Spain).  White, 1996b, reviews financial sector
issues for  15 small open economies.  It considers the impediments to  liberalization; strategic
issues of reform; some practical issues (related to monetary policy, money and capital market
developments) and the benefits of foreign financial firm presence.  These studies generally find
that opening up has led to improvements in local institutions and standards, that open financial
systems are more contestable and more efficient and have better services (box 1).
These beneficial effects appear to occur at low increases in the presence of foreign FSPs.  In
Argentina, for example, the ratio of operational costs to assets declined from  1.3% in  1990 to
0.5% in April 1997, while during the same period the share of total assets held by foreign banks
only rose from 15% to 22% (Arriazu, 1997).'9 The banking system in Colombia has low levels
17 Guash and Glaessner (1995) analyze the issue of bidding for credit lines, which has some analogous features.
8  Other  ex-ante  studies  include  for  the  Canada-US  FTA,  Swedlove  and  Evanoff,  1992,  Sauve  and
Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1993;  and for NAFTA, Musalem et al. 1994, and Glaessner and Oks, 1994.  Wang,  1995,
and Borish et al. 1996 review and assess the  progress of central European  countries in preparing  their financial
sectors for integration with the EU.
"  This  is  corroborated  by  Dick  (1996)  who  finds  that  X-inefficiency  levels  for  Argentine  banks  declined
significantly over the  1991-1994 period, due to increases in competition as a result of deregulation and growth.13
of  foreign  ownership,  about  4%,  yet the  marginal  costs  of providing  banking  services  has
declined substantially as financial reform, including allowing more entry, progressed (Barajas,
1996).  And for the EU,  while the  announcement and  implementation of the  Single Market
Programme (SMP) led to a dramatic shift in the strategic focus of banks in all countries towards
competition and an increase in cross-border mergers and entry through new establishment, the
expected widespread increase  in  foreign bank  ownership of  domestic  banking firms has  not
materialized (Gardener, Molyneux and Moore, 1  997a and 1  997b).
There is much anecdotal evidence that foreign FSPs introduced new financial products and
enhanced  the  quality  of  existing  services, and  spurred  improvements  in  the  quality  of  the
institutional  framework.  In  many  countries,  for  example,  foreign  FSPs  have  started  new
consumer financial products, initiated the development of local bond markets and initiated asset-
backed securities programs.  In the Philippines, foreign companies have led to improvements in
insurance services.  Throughout the developing world, one can find bankers who have formerly
worked in foreign financial firms as indicators of beneficial spill-overs.
The experience in the US with financial deregulation is also relevant.  Banks in the US have
been  subject  to  extremely  severe  entry  barriers  in  the  form  of  branching  restrictions.
Traditionally, banks were regulated across state lines and until the 1980s were unable to cross
county lines in many states as well. As a result, the US banking industry has been extremely
segmented with thousand of banks and bank holding companies.  Jayaratne and Strahan (1996)
study the effects of the lifting of some of the inter-state and inter-county restrictions  on bank
expansion, a policy very similar to liberalizing the establishment of FSPs across borders.  They
find that banks' profits increase and loan quality improves after states permit statewide branching
and  interstate  branching.  They  also  find  evidence  that  more  competitive  banking
markets-following  deregulation-better  discipline bank  managers, thereby  further improving
bank performance.14
Box 1: Recent  Experiences  with Internationalization  of Financial  Services
The effects of the  1992 Single Market Programme (SMP) has  been recently reviewed  in a number  of
studies (EU, 1997), with three studies on the financial services sectors in the EU.  The major finding of the study on
banking  markets  and  credit  sector (Credit Institutions and Banking)  was that  the  SMP  has made  a  substantial
contribution  to the restructuring  of European banking markets and has contributed to the  increased influence  of
external market forces on banking strategies throughout the EU.  Particularly large effects were observed in those
markets which had  experienced  less financial sector reform, such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and  Spain.  While a
number of barriers still remain which restrain the exploitation of the full benefits of the  EU, changes to date have
facilitated more competitive banking systems.  Especially retail loan and mortgage pricing in Greece, Italy, Portugal
and Spain improved.  Consumers are  benefiting from a wider range  of financial services and  new channels of
delivery have  opened  up.  The  SMP has  also  led  to the  further  realization of  economies  of  scale and  greater
opportunities for exploiting economies of scope.  There has been no strong evidence that, in response to the SMP,
banks have changed strategies in ways that threaten the stability of banking systems in the EU.
Reviews of the specific experiences of Greece, Ireland and Portugal (Honohan, 1995 and  1997b) show that
domestic deregulation  was probably more important than  internationalization in reforming their  financial  sectors
and leading to a large expansion in financial services.  In all countries, however, EU-entry triggered and accelerated
this  domestic  deregulation and  reform.  Initially banking  margins  increased, as  banks were  freed  from  interest
controls  and  regulated  lending.  As  competition  increased,  however,  margins  subsequently  fell  and  services,
particularly for consumers, improved in quality and breadth. While the number of foreign FSPs which entered was
substantial, their actual market penetration remained remarkably limited.  In the short-run, domestic FSPs lost some
market shares, but, the increased competition also spurred greater efficiency with downward trends in staff costs.
An experience particularly  interesting is that of Spain.  The Spanish banking system was traditionally  a
highly  regulated  one,  characterized  by  a  lack  of  foreign  competition,  significant  investment  and  reserve
requirements,  and the domination of  large banks (Vives,  1990).  The onset of the  liberalization process in Spain
occurred in the early seventies with the relaxation of limits on entry and branching and the freeing of interest rates,
but suffered in its progress early on.  During the period of 1978 to 1985, a banking crisis erupted that was in part the
result of large banks having strong interests in industries which suffered heavily from the oil shock and general bad
management and poor monitoring.  Following the crisis, the process of financial sector reform  in fact accelerated
with the entry into the EU.  Increased competition, lower margins and operating expenses, an increase in financial
intermediation,  and  improved management within the banking  sector resulted by the mid-1990s.  Concentration
increased,  but  market  power  declined,  and  quality of  services  improved.  While there  was  much  merger  and
acquisitions activity, actual entry by foreign financial firms remained smalr (see further Pastor, Perez, and Quesala,
1997).
For  Mexico,  NAFTA  triggered  internationalization  of  financial  services,  with  a  further  acceleration
following the December 1994 crisis.  This has involved more foreign investment in the financial sector since 1995,
with 16 newly-chartered foreign banks and two large banks now majority foreign controlled, and about  18% of the
banking system is now in foreign hands, compared to about  1% prior to  1994.  This also has had  a stabilizing
influence  on  capital flows.  The agreement also had  a  significant  impact on  reducing the  tendency  for policy
reversal during the financial crisis.
For  many  countries,  the  effects of  allowing  greater foreign  entry appears to be  foremost  in terms  of
increasing the number, rather than in greatly expanding the share of the market of foreign FSPs.  The beneficial
effects on the contestability of the domestic market also appear to be a function of the relative number of banks,
rather than their size of the market.  Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga,  1997, for example,  using data on
individual bank balance sheets and profit statements of 80 countries (of which more than 50 developing countries
and transition economies) over the period 1988-95-leading  to about 7900 individual bank operations, find that it is
the number of foreign banks, rather than their share of the domestic market, which  is negatively correlated with
domestic banks' profitability and overhead expenses.15
The effects of internationalization and capital account liberalization and monetary policy has
also been considered.  In some  countries, for example, New Zealand, the financial system  is
largely in the hand of foreigners, without any adverse affects on monetary policy or more volatile
capital outflows (Nicholl, 1997). There is also little evidence that foreign firms do not have the
commitment to the local market.  In New Zealand, so far as is evident at present, there have been
no adverse affects on the access to  financial services by various agents. Provided  the playing
field is level, that little reasons to expect that foreign financial firms would not be willing to
provide financial services across a broad section of the economy and instead would operate only
in the most profitable segments. If gaps in service are a problem, nevertheless, foreign firms, like
domestic  firms,  can  be  encouraged  to  provide  financial  services  in  less  profitable  market
segments through explicit subsidies or regulations. There is also evidence for the US that foreign
FSPs do not just  follow firms from their home countries, but do allocate a significant share of
their business to non-home, i.e., host-country borrowers (Nolle and Seth, 1997), thus generating
beneficial  spillovers. 20 Wengel (1995) studies the trade flows in banking services among  141
countries using information on more than 3600 banks which operate internationally.  He finds,
among others, that the relaxation of exchange and capital controls by potential host  countries
diminishes the incentives of banks to seek direct representation, thus confirming the substitution
links between capital account liberalization and internationalization.
The  argument  that  internationalization  will  lead  to  large  capital  outflows  appears
questionable.  The experiences of capital flight from many developing countries in the 1  970s and
early 1980s under  circumstances with significant capital controls and very limited presence of
foreign banks clearly demonstrate that foreign banks are not the main cause and  that capital
controls can not limit capital flight.  Rather the causes underlying capital flight are typically poor
and  inconsistent  policies,  political  uncertainty,  and  high  and  variable  taxes  that  make  the
domestic market an unattractive and risky place to invest in (see Claessens, 1997 and Schineller,
1997, for recent work).  More generally, disintermediation and dollarization is mostly a function
of the degree of domestic financial repression than of the degree of capital account liberalization.
Presence of foreign financial firms is more likely to reduce capital flight, as was observed in
several recent episodes (e.g., in Argentina and Thailand foreign banks received large amounts of
deposits from domestic banks when concerns arose about the quality of domestic banks).
Costs  and Risk  Some questions on costs and potential risks of foreign entry have been
addressed  in  the  literature  on  experiences  with  internationalization.  It  is  clear  from  the
experiences of the EU and NAFTA that regulation that is justifiable  in terms of fiduciary  or
monetary-policy  concerns can be distinguished from regulation that is primarily motivated to
protect  domestic  FSPs.  And specific  monetary  policy  concerns can  be  dealt  with  through
traditional monetary policy instruments or capital controls (Nicholl, 1997).  Most developed and
some developing countries allow for free entry of foreign FSPs without any adverse effects on
20 On the other hand, it has been found for the US that binding capital adequacy requirements associated with the
decline in the Japanese stock markets resulted in a decline in commercial lending by Japanese banks in the US (Peek
and Rosengren, 1997). The effects on US borrowers and financial flows more broadly are not known, however, and
borrowers may have been able to off-set decline in financing.16
the conduct of monetary policy or soundness of the financial system (of course, foreign entrants
are  screened  for  "fitness  and  properness").  At  the  opposite, in  many  countries,  especially
developing countries, foreign banks have proven to be a source of stable funding in the face of
adverse shocks. 2'  In Argentina especially (where 22% of all bank assets are held by foreign
banks) but also in Mexico in late 1994 and early 1995 the (then few) foreign banks were able to
maintain access to off-shore funding while domestic banks experienced strains.
Foreign banks have also played an important role in allowing banking systems to recover
from crises.  In Mexico and Venezuela foreign banks are emerging as key players in efforts to
recapitalize and restructure banks (two troubled banks have been bought up by Spanish banks, a
Canadian  bank  now  controls a  third  bank,  and  foreign financial  institutions  are  reportedly
considering the purchase of several other troubled or intervened banks).  In Poland and Hungary
foreign banks have brought in very useful know-how and capital, and in New Zealand much new
capital.  Finally,  in several small economies (e.g., Panama) foreign banks play a predominant
role in the provision of domestic banking services.
Even though  internationalization in  the presence of  a poorer  functioning  regulatory  and
supervisory domestic system may not allow the country to reap all the benefits and could lead to
some risks, this needs to be balanced by the fact that foreign FSPs are likely better capitalized
and also subject to more stringent supervisory systems (see further Gavin and Hausmann, 1996).
This  suggests  that  internationalization  need  not  be  limited  by  the  quality  of  the  domestic
regulatory  and  supervisory system, rather the opposite may be the case.  In fact,  some  least
developed, lower-income countries have committed themselves under the FSA to (almost) fully
open their financial systems to foreign FSPs, suggesting that a poorly-developed financial system
and a weak institutional framework need not be constraints to opening up.
It is of course correct that countries stand to benefit more from domestic deregulation (and
internationalization)  when  their  financial  system  satisfies  certain  minimum  regulatory  and
supervisory  requirements.  Many  of  these  requirements had  already  been  identified  in  the
literature on domestic deregulation and have been recently further refined (e.g., IMF 1997, BIS
1997, and G-10 1997).  These minimum standards cover prudential regulations, and a  certain
level of institutional development, independence and level of human skills of the regulators.  It is
also clear that, while national treatment of FSPs does not necessarily guarantee fair international
competition,  countries  should  not  wait  for  harmonization  to  open  up, 22 also  since  full
21  The G-10 (1997, Annex  1) report has then  also included the share of foreign participation in total assets in its
illustrative list of indicators of robust financial systems.
22  Four reasons  are typically  mentioned  (see also William White,  1996a, and  Dermine,  1996): first, significant
progress  in harmonization  has  already  been achieved, particularly through  the  BIS (for  example,  Basle  capital
adequacy requirements), but also through the work of IOSCO and others (see William White  1996a for a review).
Second,  the  net  differences  in  regulatory  burden  are  not  that  large  between  many,  albeit  mostly  developed,
countries. Furthermore, with open capital accounts, market participants already engage in actions across regulatory
jurisdictions which reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens. Thirdly, competition among regulatory systems can lead
to an overall reduction in unnecessary regulatory burdens while fears of a race to the bottom are tempered because
there are  some automatic  checks and  balances.  A  race to the top  is more likely, as on  one hand  there will be
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harmonization  can take  considerable time. 23 The EU  Single Market Programme  (SMP),  for
example, has proceeded in a beneficial way without full harmonization among EU-members.
While full harmonization may not be necessary, increased harmonization, including through
regional agreements, can of course be beneficial.  Many efforts are indeed underway (under the
auspices of BIS, G-10, IOSCO, etc.) and these efforts have accelerated recently (William White,
1996a). Complementary, cooperation between various regulatory agencies on the supervision of
FSPs and more sharing of information on their cross-border transactions has also increased, and
many  bilateral  and  multilateral  efforts  are  underway.  Furthermore,  the  process  of
internationalization  accelerates pressures for improving regulatory systems in many countries.
Host countries,  for example, may only  allow access to  their markets if  they are sufficiently
assured that the regulatory authorities in home countries appropriately supervise their domestic
FSPs (for example, the establishment of branches of banks from some emerging markets in the
US is being delayed by concerns of US regulators over the quality of supervision of banks in
their respective host countries, thus creating additional pressures for further upgrading of host
country supervision). 24
Experiences in a number of countries which have been opened up suggest that local FSPs
have not  been eliminated-and  the quality of the financial system  and financial services has
improved. Nevertheless, internationalization can put pressure on local FSPs (including foreign
FSPs  already  established).  This  can  lead  to  constituencies  opposing  further  opening  up.
Experience and empirical analysis suggests a number of particular circumstances which influence
how well domestic  FSPs  fare after exposure to  international competition.  As  expected, the
degree of (prior) domestic regulation has a negative impact on how domestic FSPs fare. 25 The
existing asset-quality of banks and  other financial institutions has also been a  factor.  Better
capitalized  domestic  banks  have been  able to  maintain profitability  more  easily  (Claessens,
Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga, 1997), suggesting that the existing incentive framework for banks
is an important determinant of the adjustment process when opening up. 26 The scope for new
business opportunities (through both old and new services), which in turn  is a function of the
overall economic growth, has allowed domestic FSPs in countries which opened up to maintain
profitability  (Claessens,  Demirguc-Kunt,  and  Huizinga,  1997).  Possible  adverse  effects  on
domestic  labor in the financial sector are sometimes mentioned.  But the demand for trained
competition between regulatory agencies to attract financial services business while on the other hand the FSPs will
have incentives to do business in strong regulatory jurisdictions (with no undue regulatory burden).  Fourth, trying
to achieve a harmonized set of standards may increase the chances of regulatory capture and poor regulations.
23  Skipper (1996) describes the OECD harmonization experience for trade in insurance, which started in 1961 and
which have essentially been abandoned as no agreement could be reached.
24 An example is the requirement under NAFTA and the legislation in the US that required Mexican authorities to be
capable of undertaking consolidated supervision before Mexican banks could gain greater access to the US market.
2S At the same time, remaining macroeconomic domestic distortions, including inflation and high real interest rates,
while  clearly  not  beneficial from  an  overall economic  point of  view, has  allowed  domestic  FSPs to  maintain
margins (see Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1997).
26  Banks in lower-income countries appear to have fared worse when foreign banks entered, further indicating that
initial institutional development matters.18
labor typically increases as foreign financial firms establish a domestic presence.  And in any
case, the effects are no different from other sectors experiencing efficiency gains.
Furthermore, some countries which have suffered from severe financial crises-triggered  in
part by macro and micro distortions-have  opened up to foreign FSPs and greatly benefited, thus
suggesting that initial conditions can truly be "sunk" costs and need not restrain the opening up.
Finally, market concentration, of both foreign banks as well as domestic banks, has a significant
positive  effect  on  domestic  bank  profitability,  indicating  that  market  structure  and  the
contestability  of  the  financial  sector  more  generally needs  to  be  taken  into  account  when
evaluating the impact of internationalization.
6.  INITIAL  CONDITIONS  AND COST OF FINANCIAL SERVICES  IN ASIA
INITIAL  CONDITIONS
Strengths Countries  in Asia are in a good position for internationalization as many of them
have  strong fundamentals, also  in the financial sector.  Most Asian countries have kept real
deposit interest rates positive and have deep financial systems, with the ratio of credit to GDP
above 50% and for Hong Kong even up to 285%.  They also have gradually liberalized their
capital account and have had ample access to foreign financing in recent years.  Countries have
also  announced plans  aimed at further deregulating their financial systems, e.g.,  India, South
Korea and  Japan.  Some Asian countries have already created special, off-shore centers with
certain  regulatory  and  tax  advantages,  which  already  suggests  a  desire  to  allow  more
internationalization.  Several Asian countries have also stated their aim to make their  country a
regional  financial center, which must be  based on a belief that their financial institutions  can
compete on a regional (or global) basis.
High economic growth in Asia creates many new business and financial opportunities which
can cushion any negative impact of opening up on existing FSPs.  It is, for example, generally
projected that financial services will grow at rates much exceeding overall  economic growth,
with consumer financial services in particular expected to  expand at growth rates two to three
times GDP growth rates.  It also appears that most of Asia, with the possible exception of the
transition  economies,  satisfies the minimum standards in  financial system  supervision to  the
same degree as or better than other developing countries do. 27
Weaknesses  At the  same time,  it is clear, however,  that Asian  countries have financial
systems which are, relative to income levels, institutionally not that well developed (Claessens
and Glaessner,  1997, who focus on East Asia, but many of the arguments apply to India too).
Many countries in the region, for example, need improvements in their payments systems and the
development of money markets and central bank open market operations has lagged in many
27 While  regulators  in most Asian  countries  would posses  the capacity  to regulate  their financial  systems  adequately,
not all may  have  the legal  and  political  backing  to exercise  their  judgments.19
countries.  Recent global advances in credit analysis and risk management techniques in banks
have not  been incorporated in  banking practices in  many Asian  countries  (many banks,  for
example,  do  not  appear to  measure  and manage  their currency  and  interest rates risks  very
carefully).  There is a general scarcity in the region of people with qualified financial skills.
And the region's financial system is burdened with relatively large amounts of non-performing
loans, resulting in part from poor credit analysis skills.
This  slower  institutional  progress reflects  to  some  extent  that  institutional  development
typically  lags real sector development and change, with the latter very rapid in  East Asia in
particular.  It also, however, has been due to large state-ownership and poor incentives in many
countries, and the heavy role of the government in the financial sector.  To date, for example,
almost always  bank depositors,  and often bank owners and managers as well, have not been
asked to bear the burden of past mistakes leading to bank insolvencies and failures. In general,
countries  in  the  region need  to  work  more on  designing  and  implementing  regulatory  and
supervisory frameworks aimed at creating more robust financial systems.  But, these weaknesses
need not present barriers to the (further) internationalization of financial services in Asia.  At the
opposite, foreign FSPs are likely to help in the inevitable transition process.  In Thailand, for
example, foreign investors and foreign banks may play an important role in the restructuring of
weak banks and finance companies, including through the infusion of new capital.
COST OF FINANCIAL  SERVICES IN ASIA
An analysis of the impact of internationalization will have to start with a comparison of the
existing costs of and efficiency in providing financial services.  In principle, cost estimates for a
standardized  set  of  financial  services, across  all  Asian  countries  could  be  collected.  This
approach could follow that of the study of the EU-1992-program .(Price Waterhouse,  1988), or
that for the recent ex-post 1992, EU study (1  997).28 The costs and performance measures could
then be linked to the degree of de-facto openness.
The problem with a cross-country comparison of cost estimates is that there are a number of
regulatory,  tax  and  macro-  and  micro-economic  factors  that  affect  the  costs  of  financial
intermediation.  In  particular,  simple  comparisons  of  nominal  and  real  interest  rates  across
countries  can  be  seriously  flawed as  a  means to  establish the  competitiveness  of  banking
2S  In the first study, cost measures for a number of financial services (all standardized in some fashion, e.g., using
share of GDP per capita as a way to standardize loan amounts) were obtained. The exact financial services covered
were: banking (7 measures: spreads for: consumer loan, credit card, mortgage, and commercial loan to a small and
medium-size enterprise; and costs of: LC, FX-draft and traveler cheque); insurance (5 measures: life, home, motor,
fire/theft and public liability cover); and securities (4 measures: commission costs for: a private equity transaction,
private bond transaction,  institutional equity transaction and institutional bond transaction).  In the  1997 banking
sector study,  data  on bank  performance, costs  and  economies of  scale,  interest  rates on  lending  and  deposits,
mergers and  acquisitions activities, cross-border joint-ventures,  intra-EU trade  in banking  services, and  banking
concentration as well as qualitative responses from questionnaires and individual cases studies (on strategic issues)
were used to study the effect of the Single Market Programme across countries and institutions.20
systems. Box 3 provides an example for Argentina of some of the corrections which need to be
made  to  allow  for  better  estimates  of  the  cost  of  financial  intermediation  using  aggregate
financial data. The decomposition shows that most of the level of the nominal interest rate can be
explained by factors other than the efficiency of financial intermediation.
Measuring directly financial intermediation costs on a comparable basis across countries can
thus be difficult as there are many factors which affect the costs in providing financial services in
a particular country. Banking margins, for example, are affected by reserve requirements (which
raise the intermediation costs), inflation (which influence the degree of profitability necessary to
maintain real capital), various aspects of taxation of financial services, (large) credit-differentials
between (firns  in) countries, the effects of non-performing loans, and the presence of a deposit
insurance  scheme.  To illustrate this complexity, we decomposed the raw,  aggregate banking
spread  for  seven  East Asian countries using  an accounting model  (Montes-Negret and  Papi,
1996) to get at a cost of financial intermediation which corrected aggregate margins for reserve
requirements, inflation (to maintain real bank capital), some aspects of taxation, the required rate
of return on bank capital and the effects of non-performing loans.  Table 2 provides the figures
(with substantial methodological and data problems remaining, for example, the (net) regulatory
burden  on the financial  sector is very hard to  compute). 29 The large differences between  the
actual reported margins and the derived intermediation costs (net of corrections) make clear that
the corrections are large.  But, the table makes the point that raw banking spreads can be a very
misleading measure of intermediation costs.
29  The importance of taxation on costs of  financial services, for example,  depends on the  ability of the  financial
institutions to pass this tax on to their consumers (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga,  1997, find that banks are able to
pass-through  income taxes to consumers).21
Box 3: Decomposing  the Level of Nominal Interest  Rates
Box Table I  provides a decomposition of the domestic lending interest rates to non-prime borrowers for
Argentina.  The domestic  interest rate is decomposed  into the  intemational rates (US  dollar  or other relevant
currency); country risk premium; expected nominal exchange rate depreciation (or appreciation) (or separately,
real exchange rate depreciation (or appreciation) and expected inflation differential); exchange rate risk premium;
direct and  indirect taxes on financial services; credit risks of domestic banks; bank  profit margins; and  credit
spreads.
Box  Table  1: Decomposition  of Lending  Rate:  Argentina
April  996  April 1997
Macroeconomic  Risks
Base Rate  - US Treasury Bills (3 months)  4.96  5.10
Country Risk  0.76  0.35
Argentina's  Treasury Bills in dollars (3 months)  5.72  5.45
Exchange Rate Risk on Government Debt  1.20  0.15
Argentina's  Treasury Bills in pesos (3 months)  6.92  5.60
Micro-economic  Risks
CD in dollars (3 months)  7.83  5.79
Exchange Rate Risk on Bank's  Deposits  2.87  0.98
Risk of Banks  1.20  0.15
CD in pesos (3 months)  11.90  6.92
Average (Peso + Dollar) Deposit Rate  9.46  6.31
Operational Costs  7.10  5.33
Pure Costs  3.91  3.20
Greater Rotation of Deposits (-E-)  3.20  2.13
Reserves for non-perfonning  loans  2.43  1.48
Taxes  1.80  0.97
(-) Income on Services  -2.70  -2.91
Profits  2.35  2.79
Average Lending Rate (Pesos + Dollars)  20.40  13.98
Note:  Argentina runs a currency board with the peso to the US-dollar rate set at one.
Source: Arriazu (1997).
In general, many other factors will affect margins (see also Vittas, 1991).  The EU-study
(1997) for example, found that margins were significantly influenced by business cycle effects
and the increased emphasis on strengthening capital adequacy and shareholder value during the
last few years, which meant a need for higher profitability.  In addition, structural changes in
financial systems will affect changes in the cost of financial intermediation.  Over the last few
years,  for  example,  many  Asian  countries  have  made  significant  improvements  in  the
institutional  infrastructure for equity markets. Trading and settlement systems have improved,
regulatory frameworks have been clarified, etc., thus reducing the cost of financial intermediation
through equity markets.  While some of these effects are not independent of the opening up to
foreign capital and financial intermediation (the improvement in capital markets infrastructure,22
for example, has been to a significant extent driven by foreign forces, see further World Bank
1997), these effects are difficult to correct for.
The  approach  taken  here  is  to  document  several  measures  of  costs  of  financial
intermediation,  including  average costs  as reported from  individual bank  balance  sheets and
profits  and  loss statements, estimates of the efficiency of  doing an  equity transaction  by an
institutional  investor  in  the  respective  markets  (from  institutional  investors  surveys),  and
operational costs and pay-back measures for insurance (Tables 3 through  5).  We then try  to
relate these to measures of openness.
7.  STRUCTURE  AND INSTITUTIONAL  QUALITY  OF FINANCIAL  SERVICES
PROVISION  IN ASIA
The  structure of  the financial  sector and  its  various  subsectors matters  in  a  number  of
respects for the costs and efficiency of financial services.  First, as for any economic activity, the
degree of competition can be influenced by the number and type of participants, both on the user
and provider side of financial services.  Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1997) find, for example,
that market concentration has a positive effect on bank profitability.  Second, the way financial
intermediaries are allowed to  organize (and  organize themselves  in practice)  can importantly
influence  whether possible  economies  of scope  and  scale in  the joint  production  of  various
financial services can be realized (see for example, Saunders and Walter, 1994, which promote
the case for universal banking in part on economics of scale and scope; see further Berger and
Humphrey  1996, and Barth, Nolle and Rice, 1997).  Third, there are broader links between the
various parts of the financial sector as well as the real sector which can influence the costs of
financial  intermediation.  Demirguc-Kunt  and  Huizinga  (1997)  find,  for  example,  that  the
development  of  the  stock  market  affects  net  interest  margins  positively,  suggesting  a
complementarity between  bank and equity  financing.  Fourth, the quality  of the institutional
framework will greatly influence the efficiency with which financial institutions are willing or
able to operate.
In principle,  detailed empirical work may allow one to  separate the  effects of  (lack of)
internationalization from other structural characteristics (which may or may not  be  related to
policies) affecting costs end efficiency.  We acknowledge this but at the same time realize that
this is a new research area even for developed countries (see Berger and Humphrey,  1996 and
Berger et al, 1993 for an overview).  We rather present a simple overview of the structure of the
financial system in each country, all as of the end of 1996 (Table 6), where the information is
collected from World Bank and IMF, central banks and private markets reports in and outside the
Asian countries.
About half of the Asian countries (India, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand)
allow  (with  some  restrictions)  the  underwriting,  stock-broking,  and  fund  management  by
commercial banks.  In Hong Kong only merchant banks  are allowed to  engage  in securities
underwriting  and trading;  in Indonesia and South Korea only  securities firms  are allowed to
engage in these businesses.  In all countries except Indonesia and South Korea, banks are allowed23
to  have  equity  stakes  in  non-financial  and  financial  institutions,  up  to  certain  percentages
(varying from  15% to  40%) of banks' equity.  Indonesia does allow investments by banks in
securities companies, up to 15% of the banks or the securities company's equity.
Table  7 provides the number of banks and branches, market concentration (share  of top
banks) and the number of domestic and foreign insurance companies. Indonesia has the largest
absolute number of banks (domestic and foreign combined), more than 200.  The least number of
banks are in Thailand.  India has the largest number of branches and Singapore the least.  But,
relative to population, Indonesia has the least number of bank branches (about 20 per million
people) and Hong Kong the most (more than 200 per million people).  Hong Kong has the largest
number of foreign banks, more than 150 (which is actually more than the US), with Malaysia, the
Philippines  and  Thailand about  15, and  South  Korea the  least,  9.  Singapore has  the  most
concentrated banking system in the region, with the top three banks having about a 3/4 share of
the total loan market.  In Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Thailand, the top three banks have about
half of the loan market, while in the other markets the top three banks have  1/3 or less of the
market.  State banks are most important in India, followed by Indonesia and least important in
Thailand, Malaysia and  Hong Kong.  For insurance, the numbers  of domestic companies  are
substantial  for  all  countries  except  India,  but  foreign  insurance  firms  are  few-except  for
Singapore, and in India and Indonesia there are actually no foreign insurers present.
Table  8 provides  the financial depth (ratio of credit provided by  the banking  system to
GDP); stock and bond market capitalization (as a ratio to GDP), and liquidity of these markets
(turnover as a share of market capitalization).  Hong Kong and Singapore stand out as having
very deep and broad financial systems.  South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand have reasonable
deep financial system, while those of the Philippines and Indonesia are less deep, and that of
India is the least deep.
Table  9 provides  information on the institutional environment for banking and quality  of
loan portfolios. An indicator of quality of the operating and regulatory environment for banks
(deposit insurance, regulatory integrity, quality of supervisory agencies, and legal framework) for
Asian countries has been provided by Ramos (1997a).  He ranks bank supervision quality from
very good and improving for Hong Kong to weak for Thailand.  He also classifies the degree of
transparency and the quality of disclosure.  Here the rating is from very good for Hong Kong to
poor  for  Singapore.  Ramos  (1997b) provides  an  indicator of  the overall  fragility of  Asian
systems, FRAGILITY.  Here he ranks as Hong Kong and Singapore as most solid, and Thailand
as the most fragile. His CAMELOT indicator (Capital, Assets, Management, Earnings, Liquidity,
Operating environment, and  Transparency) for domestic banks'  quality varies  similarly, from
Hong Kong as the best, India as the worst, and Thailand as the next to worst (South Korea is not
reported).  Table 9 also reports data on non-performing loans, both from official sources and as
estimated recently by Ramos (1  997b). The accuracy of the data from official sources in reporting
the true degree of non-performing assets can be limited-as  recent events in Thailand have made
clear-and  as  the  much  higher  figure estimated  by  Ramos  (1997b)  for  both  Thailand  and
Indonesia compared to the officially reported figures suggest. Nevertheless, the banking systems24
of India, Indonesia and Thailand stand out as having a high degree of reported non-performing
loans as of end-1996, 19.5%, 10.4% and 7.7% respectively.
8.  BARRIERS  TO FREE  FLOW  OF FINANCIAL  SERVICES  IN ASIA
An analysis of barriers to the free flows of financial services will have to  start with the
current formal and practical barriers in place by type of financial services.  These barriers can be
further separated into entry (or market access) and lack of national treatment barriers, and limits
on the cross-border provision of financial services.:  Table  10 summarizes the degree of entry
barriers as of the end of  1996, where we use an indicator of  I  through 5, with  1 being most
closed and 5 most open.  The indicator weighs the various type of barriers (right of establishment
and  ownership,  limits  on  business activity  (ability to  establishes branch  offices and  ATMs,
restrictions on lending, universal banking authority), and residency requirements). 3 '  The table is
based on  a number of sources and has as much as possible been cross-checked with country
officials and other sources (including private markets in and outside country).  The table provides
both current barriers as well as the degree to which countries have already committed themselves
to opening up.  Annex Table 1 provides the criteria used to create the ratings (details on barriers
for individual countries are available from the authors).
There is a large diversity in current entry barriers across the countries and sectors within the
countries,  varying  from  almost  completely  open  (Hong  Kong, for  all  financial  services)  to
virtually closed (South Korea, particularly for banking services and India for insurance services).
In some cases, restrictions apply equally to domestic and foreign FSPs.  Malaysia, for example,
while it has more barriers for foreigners, has not licensed any new domestic or foreign securities
brokers  or insurance companies  in the last few years.  And South Korea  imposes  very high
capital  requirements on all investment management firns.  But,  there are quite a  number of
restrictions which apply to foreign FSPs only.  In many Asian countries, the ability of foreign
banks to establish branches is much more limited than that of domestic banks and in all countries
foreign banks face limits and tighter regulations in opening up ATMs.
Across the countries, entry into banking services tends to be slightly more liberal than for
insurance or securities markets, although there are significant differences across countries in the
treatment of the three type of financial services.  For securities markets, the index shows Hong
Kong as the most open and Thailand as the least open, with South Korea and India also  very
3  In the  format followed under the GATS-negotiations, four modes of opening up are distinguished: commercial
presence  (i.e., entry of foreign FSP, through new establishment,  joint ventures,  or acquisition  of existing firms,
including through  privatizations); cross-border supply; movement of consumers; or movement of  suppliers.  For
internationalization  of financial  services,  commercial  presence  and cross-border  supply are in practice the most
important.
3  All countries make entry dependent on the foreign FSP satisfying certain prudential guidelines.  In some
countries,  entry is in addition  explicitly  limited  to the world's  top 200 (or some other number)  of FSPs. We do not
consider  these conditions  in principle  to constitute  barriers  to entry, although  if their implementation  is, we would
have tried to capture it.25
closed.  For insurance markets, the practice index shows that Hong Kong and Singapore are the
least  restrictive,  followed  by  Thailand,  Philippines,  Indonesia  and  South  Korea,  and  then
Malaysia, with India as essentially closed.  Restrictions on cross-border trade are somewhat less
than  entry restrictions,  with  several  countries allowing  in principle  free  access to  off-shore
banking  services.  India is  an  exception as  it has  significant capital  controls. Nevertheless,
barriers against free trade in financial services are highly correlated with entry barriers; most of
Asia, for example, does not allow cross-border trade in insurance services.
Countries  have  already  made  commitments  regarding  the  degree  of  financial  services
liberalization under the Financial Services Agreement (FSA) of the GATS, 1995 (details on these
countries' commitments 32 (or "schedules") as per the end of the negotiations in mid-1995 are
available from the authors).  Table 10 summarizes these in the indicator "Commitments" which
again ranges from 1 (most closed) to 5 (most open).  Based on 1995 commitments, the most open
banking market would be Hong Kong, followed by Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, India,
Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea.  Committed to the most open securities market is Hong
Kong, followed by Indonesia, Singapore, India, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and South
Korea.  The country committed  to opening up  its insurance  sector the most  is Hong  Kong,
followed by Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea and India.
Comparing the  commitment and practice  indicator (and  more detailed analysis  available
from the  authors)  shows that commitments  can fall short of  current practices as  well as  go
beyond them.  Hong Kong, for example, is committed to more liberal entry in insurance services
than current practices.  Many Asia countries, however, have made commitments which fall short
of current practices, particularly in banking services, but  also in other financial services. The
Philippines, for example, has committed to allowing ownership in banking only up to 49% while
current practice  limits  it to  up  to  60%  for existing  banks and  100% for new  banks.  And
Indonesia did not bind to its current practice of allowing up to 80% ownership in joint ventures
in brokerage services, but, as most other Asian countries, only committed to allowing ownership
in financial services up to 49%.. Compared to other countries, commitments also fall short of the
actual state of openness.  While the share of assets held by foreign banks in Asia is below that of
many other countries, for example, the level of commitment in the 1995 agreement was relatively
even lower that of many other countries (see Sorsa, 1997).
In addition to current barriers and commitments under the FSA, the analysis will also have
to  take  into  account  the  history  and  likely  progression  in  these  barriers.  Several  Asian
governments  have  recently  announced  unilateral  measures  which  go  beyond  the  current
schedules.  Singapore  (in  part motivated  by  a  desire to  further  expand  itself  as  a  regional
financial  center),  Japan  (as part  of the  Big  Bang),  and  South  Korea  (in the  context  of  the
accession to the OECD), for example, have announced liberalization of their financial systems,
including greater access by foreign FSPs recently.  Offers submitted under the current round also
32  Since this was an interim  agreement,  countries  reserved  the right to change  them during the currently ongoing
negotiations.  We do not analyze already submitted offers for the  current negotiations as not all Asian  countries
have made offers.26
tend to go beyond  the previous  offers.  In addition, countries have made  some commitments
under regional agreements (ASEAN and APEC).  It is possible that some of this future opening
up has been anticipated and led to changes in the current domestic financial industry and could
thus be captured under current practice. 33
Table  10 also provides an indicator for the severity of capital controls and exchange rate
restrictions, both inward and outward. 34 The indicator shows that there is quite a variety among
Asian countries in the severity of their capital controls: Hong Kong is almost completely open
(except for some restrictions on inward investment), Indonesia has been very open-since  1970,
South Korea still had significant controls until recently, and India is the most closed.  Most of the
capital controls, such as remittance restrictions, apply to all type of firms and investors, but many
can be expected to affect FSPs more severely. In addition, there exist limits on foreign portfolio
and  direct  investment-varying  substantially  among  Asian  countries35-that  can  affect  the
attractiveness to foreign FSPs of entering certain markets.
In  addition to  these barriers, there are other, legal  barriers, some of which  are financial
sector-specific and others which apply more generally (the latter would include,  for example,
general labor restrictions limiting the hiring of foreign professionals, etc.).  Financial market and
regulatory  practices  can  also  constitute  barriers  against  foreign  service  providers  (e.g.,
preferential  access to  central  bank  financing)  and  foreign FSPs  may  face  some  "nuisance"
barriers.  Furthermore,  financial  intermediation  depends  on  a  host  of  auxiliary  services
(accounting,  legal,  consulting),  many  of  which  are not  fully  liberalized  in  Asian  countries
(accounting services in Indonesia, for example, have nationality limits) and which can make it
more difficult for foreign FSPs to provide financial services in an efficient manner.
It is impossible to quantify all these factors, let alone to assert whether or not they constitute
effective (binding) barriers to the establishment of foreign firms.  Even low formal or  other
barriers may not be binding as some markets may not be attractive to foreign FSPs.  It could also
be the case that some of these barriers constitute one of the reasons for foreign FSPs to establish
themselves in these markets as they have a comparative advantage in overcoming these hurdles
or  benefiting  from  resulting  "inefficiencies"  (and,  relatedly,  the  current  costs  of  providing
financial services may have a positive relationship with foreign FSP-presence as it increases the
attractiveness of the entering).  Analyzing the exact importance of all these effects is beyond the
scope of this  study.  But, it appears that in most countries barriers are binding.  For the eight
3  There is evidence for the US and EU that deregulation has had anticipatory effects (see EU  1997 and Berger and
Humphrey,  1996).  The removal of interstate branching requirements in the US has been anticipated and led to a
consolidation of the banking industry.
34 It is derived as the weighted average of six restrictions (inward remittances, foreign borrowing, lending to non-
residents, investment abroad, investment into the country, and foreign exchange allowance) as reported in the latest
IMF's Annual Yearbook on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Restrictions.  The index is again from  I (most closed)
to 5 (most open).
3  For equity investments, for example, individual approval is required in case of Malaysia (for amounts over MS 5
million), ownership limits up to 25 percent exist for South Korea, and up to 49 percent for Indonesia (the restriction
in Indonesia has been recently been lifted). No restrictions exist in case of Hong Kong and for many sectors in the
Philippines.  See further Securities Industry Association, 1997.27
Asian  countries,  for  example, the  correlations between the  openness  indicator here  and  the
number of foreign banks (relative to the total number of banks in the particular country) and the
share of total  bank assets held by majority-owned banks at the end of  1995 (as reported  by
Claessens et al, 1997) are 0.86 and 0.54 respectively.  And for insurance, the correlation between
the openness indicator for insurance and the share of life-insurance premium volume collected by
foreign-owned  institutions  is  0.86.  In  any  case, these  barriers  are at  least  a  cost,  as  they
presumably would otherwise not so often be mentioned by foreign financial firms.
9.  MAPPING  MEASURES  OF OPENNESS TO MEASURES OF COSTS OF
FINANCIAL  SERVICES.
As will be clear by now, any attempt to link the costs of financial services with barriers to
foreign FSPs, even by detailed types  of financial service or  sub-sector, will have to  be  very
tentative given the many other factors involved.  One approach is to use data on individual FSPs
(with of course data adjusted to international comparable measures) to  investigate margins (by
type of activity), operating and other costs, and profits.  This is done by Claessens, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Huizinga, 1997 for a large number (80) of countries.  Separating domestically-owned
from foreign-owned banks, they find that an increase in the share of foreign banks leads to lower
profitability and overhead expenses for domestic banks. 36 We use the same measures here for
our set of Asian countries.
Alternatively, individual firm (borrowers and issuers) data can be used to relate the effects of
internationalization on the access firms have and costs they pay for various financial services, as
well as improvements in the allocation of resources as a result of a better financial system and
better corporate governance.  These type of studies have been done in the context of domestic
financial deregulation. Harris, Schianterelli, and Siregar, 1994, for example, study the effect that
deregulation  in Indonesia has had  on the access of firms to  bank financing.  They find  that
deregulation broadened the class of firms which had access to bank financing and lowered their
costs.  Similar studies could be done regarding the effect of foreign entry.
36 They also find that foreign banks achieve higher profits in developing countries than domestic banks and lower
profit in developed countries than domestic banks.  The first finding suggests that foreign banks have comparative
advantage in these markets.  One interpretation of the  second finding  is that the  foreign banks  are too  eager to
establish market share in developed countries and may therefore have lower profits. There is supporting empirical
evidence for the US which shows that foreign banks are actually less efficient than domestic banks (Deyoung and
Nolle, 1996). These tests can be expanded to include tests regarding the contestability of the industry, which would
require  developing  measures  of  efficiency  which  adjust  for  relevant  economies  of  scope  and  scale  (using
methodologies typically used  in studies of the developed countries' financial systems, see Berger et al.  1993 and
Berger and Humphrey, 1996 for reviews; Shaffer 1990 provides for an application of a non-structural test to Canada
and Molyneux, Lloyd-Williams and Thornton, 1994, to European banking).  Furthermore, state-owned banks could
be distinguished from private banks to see whether there are significant differences in efficiency.28
In addition,  one can study the effects of (lack of) internationalization on the breadth  and
quality of financial services.  While it is conceptually clear that one can expect better financial
services from internationalization, so far this has, at best, only been documented anecdotally and
a systematic review would be useful.  In addition, it would be useful to document improvements
in the institutional development of the financial sector, including supervision, and regulation.  So
far,  lack of  cross-country  institutional  development indicators  on  supervision  and  regulation
makes this difficult (for work on Asia, see Ramos  1997a, and for Latin America, see Pearly,
1997). There is some indirect evidence, however, that the presence of foreign investors leads to
an improvement in the overall institutional development of capital markets (see chapter 6, World
Bank, 1997b).
Given the absence of this type of detailed information and ability to perform these tests and
comparisons for a large number of Asia countries, we employ a number of simpler tests  and
comparisons. Specifically, we use our indicators reported in section 5, Tables 3 - 5. We plot these
measures against our quantitative measure of the barriers to foreign FSPs.  Since we distinguish
between the three services (banking, insurance and securities), we discuss the various costs and
efficiency measures and barrier indexes separately.
Banking Services Provision We use 1995 net margins, operating costs (overhead, including
personnel  costs)  and before tax profitability (the figures are averages of individual  domestic
banks' reported balance sheets and profit and loss statements).  Figure I indicates that there exist
a negative relationship between net margins and the share of foreign banks (in numbers).  The
Philippines has the highest net margin and little foreign bank presence (in terms of number of
banks).  Hong Kong and Singapore are countries in the lower-right hand quadrant, i.e., they score
high on foreign bank presence and low on net margins and overhead.  Net margins and overhead
also have a negative correlation with the openness indicator for banking services.  Interesting,
profit  figures  show  a  positive  relationship  with  foreign bank  presence,  consistent  with  the
findings of Claessens et al. 1997.  This may reflect that foreign banks are attracted to markets
with  high  profitability.  It  may  also  be  the  congruence  of  countries  pursuing  domestic
deregulation which, in the short-run at least, is often associated with an increased emphasis on
profitability due to more emphasis on profitability by owners and on increased capital adequacy
by  supervisors.  Finally,  it may reflect the  positive  influence of  foreign  banks in  terms  of
encouraging domestic banks to pursue greater share-holder value.
The fact that more foreign bank presence goes together with greater profitability and lower
net margins could be that where there are more foreign banks competition increases in deposit
taking and lending, thus reducing margins, but  forcing domestic (as well as foreign banks) to
develop their fee-based (e.g., non-margin) business.  Thus where there are more foreign banks,
the incentives to diversify and provide a wider range of non-interest related products and services
increase. In addition, as  greater presence of foreign banks is associated with  lower  overhead
costs, profits are boosted.
3  Foreign  banks  are those banks in which foreigners  have at least a 50% ownership  share. It includes  subsidiaries
as well as joint-ventures.29
Figure 2 repeats the same analysis, except here we use the share of assets held by foreign
banks in total assets.  Note that these are the shares of foreign banks among those banks which
report balance  sheet and profitability and loss-statements.  As a result, the shares very  likely
overstate the importance of foreign banks as foreign banks are more likely to provide complete
statements. 38  For Singapore, for example, the share of reported foreign banks assets is almost
80%,  a  significant  overstatement  in  terms  of  local  financial  intermediation  activity. 39
Nevertheless, the figures confirm the earlier result: a negative relationship between net margins
and overhead  and foreign banks'  presence and a positive relationship between foreign banks'
presence and profitability.
As noted, other country experiences suggest that there is likely a relationship between the
degree of openness and the institutional quality and fragility of the financial sector.  Figure 3
plots therefore  the CAMELOT-score for the banking systems of Table 9 (with  higher scores
indicating  a  less  transparent  and  institutionally less  developed  system)  against  the  share  of
foreign banks  (in numbers)  as well as  against the  degree of  openness  (as measured  by the
practice indicator of Table 10).  The CAMELOT-indicator is negatively associated with both the
relative  presence  of foreign banks  and the  degree  of openness,  i.e., the  institutional  quality
improves  as countries  become more  open to  foreign competition. 40 Figure  3 also  plots  the
FRAGILITY score of Table 9 against the same two openness indicators.  There also appears to
be  a  negative relationship  between FRAGILITY  and the  openness:  the more open  financial
systems  have a  lower  FRAGILITY  score. 4'  Openness appears thus  to  be  associated  with
improved institutional development and greater robustness of banking systems in Asia.
Securities Markets  We first  plot efficiency measures for  the  securities industry  to  the
openness  indexes. The efficiency  measures for the comparisons were  taken  from  data  from
Global  Securities  Consulting  Services (GSCS) and  refer to  1995.  We took  two  efficiency
measures: settlement and operational benchmarks.  The former measures the efficiency of the
securities markets in fulfilling confirmed obligations; the indicator takes into account the average
trade size, local market interest rates, the share of failed trades and the length of time for which
trades  failed.  The  latter  measure  is  an  indicator  of  the  securities  industry's  efficiency  in
settlement and safekeeping; the index incorporates operational factors such as compliance with
G30 recommendations, effectiveness of the legal and regulator majeure frameworks,  counter-
party and force risks.  Figure 4 shows a positive relationship between settlement and operational
efficiency and openness (as measured by the practice indicator of Table  10).  Hong Kong has a
very efficient trading system and relatively most open market, and India has the least efficient
and one of the most closed markets.  For Indonesia and the Philippines, there is also a positive
.3  A systematic  overestimation of the presence of foreign banks would of course imply that the  regression  lines
would be steeper.
In Singapore, foreign banks are mainly involved in off-shore business, rather than domestic intermediation.
4  The correlation coefficients between the CAMELOT-indicator and the ratio of the number of foreign to domestic
banks and the openness indicator are -0.67 and -0.44 respectively.
4K  The correlation coefficients between the FRAGILITY-indicator and the ratio of the number of foreign to domestic
banks and the openness indicator are -0.53 and -0.38 respectively30
relationship between openness and efficiency.  For the other four countries, the efficiency of the
trading systems differs little and there is no clear relationship with openness.
Figure  5  provides  the  cumulative  rate  of return  index,  the  cumulative  transaction  cost
measures, and the relative effect of costs on net rate of return (all from Table 4), plotted against
the index of openness of the securities industries.  There is clear positive relationship between
the rate of return index and openness.  And there are negative relationship between the level of
transactions and relative transactions costs for these emerging markets.  India appears to be an
outlier  in  terms of  cumulative absolute costs, while the Philippines  is an  outlier  in terms of
relative costs (mainly as the rate of return index showed a poor performance for the Philippines
over  this  period).  But,  overall these  figures suggest that more  open securities  markets  are
associated with higher rates of return and lower transaction costs.
Life-Insurance  Services Provision  We take two cost measures-the  pay-back ratio and
operating  expense ratio for life insurance.  The former relates earnings from  a life insurance
company's  investments  to  income from  premiums adjusted  for the  mismatching periods  for
revenue and outlay.  A low pay-back ratio indicates relative inefficiency while an excessively
high figure could suggest a low premium rate undermining the financial viability of insurers. The
operating expense ratio shows the percentage of premiums spent for operating expenses. The cost
measures for the insurance industry are obtained from the national supervisory authorities and
the insurance associations in each country. These measures are standardized for definitions  and
classification of data as well as calculation methods across countries.  Data for Hong Kong are
not available.
We plot the insurance markets' openness index (current practice) and both cost measures for
the six countries for which we have data (Figure 6).  We find negative relationships between pay-
back and operating costs and openness.  In terms of operating costs, South Korea appears as an
outlier, in the sense that South Korea's insurance sector is relatively closed, but has low costs
efficient.  Life-insurance  firms  from  Malaysia  and  Thailand  appear  to  have  relative  high
operating costs.  The data we have on performance of insurance companies are weak, however.
In South Korea, for example, many insurance companies are reportedly technically insolvent, so
the low operating  costs for firms in  Korea could be a very misleading indicator of their true
performance.31
9.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The  paper  discusses the  links  between  three  important  reforms:  internationalization  of
financial  services,  domestic  financial  deregulation,  and  capital  account  liberalization.
Internationalization relates to  the degree of capital account liberalization as it determines the
potential  gains  and  benefits  from  access to  foreign financial  services provided  domestically
relative to access provided and obtained off-shore.  Internationalization also relates to domestic
financial  deregulation as  it  influences the quality  and  competitiveness  of domestic  financial
services  providers.  A review  of  experiences  with  internationalization  suggests  that  almost
independent of the state of development of the domestic financial system and the openness of the
capital account, internationalization can help in the process of building more robust and efficient
financial systems by introducing international practices and standards, by improving the quality,
efficiency and breadth of financial services, and by allowing more stable sources of funds.  Given
the state of institutional development of many Asian financial systems, these benefits could be
substantial.
Cross-country empirical evidence for Asia specifically suggests that the limited openness to
date has been costly in terms of slower institutional development, greater fragility and higher
costs of financial services.  For banking services in eight Asian countries, the paper finds a clear
negative relationship between net margins and de-facto or de-jure openness to foreign FSPs. At
the same time, there is a positive relationship between profitability and openness, suggesting that
openness encourages banks to reduce costs and diversify their income (by greater reliance on fee-
income).  The more closed Asian banking systems also appear less institutional developed and
more fragile.  For  securities markets, there  is a  positive relationship between  the  degree  of
openness and measures of functional efficiency.  For life-insurance markets, we find negative
relationships between pay-back and operating costs and openness.  Hong Kong stands out  as
having both open as well as efficient and robust financial markets for all three type of financial
services.
What  do  these  economic  and  political  arguments,  lessons  from  experiences  and  Asia-
specific  evidence imply for  further internationalization, financial reform,  and capital  account
liberalization?  Asian countries will not benefit to the degree possible from  financial services
liberalization  if their domestic  financial system remains heavily restricted by regulations  that
inhibit  foreign entry, and  limit domestic  competition and the  efficient provision  of financial
services  liberalization.  This would  put  the  domestic industry  at  a  competitive  disadvantage,
create distortions, and risks inefficient resource allocation.  Extensive capital controls will not
allow the various FSPs to explore their comparative advantage and may introduce distortions and
risks as domestic and foreign FSPs will try to circumvent them.  In general, capital controls are
unlikely to reduce outflows and have been found at best to change the composition of inflows,
but not the level permanently.  In case, controls are deemed necessary, internationalization does
not  limit the  ability  of  authorities to  impose  controls or  limits  on  financial  institutions  for
prudential reasons, as long as they are applied even-handed to domestic and  foreign financial
firms.  While  in  principle  internationalization  in  the  presence  of  a  poorly  regulated  and
supervised financial domestic system could create increased risks, this needs to balanced by the
fact that foreign FSPs are likely better capitalized and also subject to more stringent supervisory32
systems in  their home countries.  This suggests that  internationalization in Asia  need not be
limited by the quality of the domestic regulatory and supervisory system.  This is confirmed by
the fact that several institutionally very poorly developed countries have committed themselves
under FSA to fully opening up.
What lessons are there for these countries for the current negotiations on financial services
under  GATS?  Given the  significant benefits  of internationalization,  Asian  countries  would
appear  to  stand  to  gain from  opening  up,  either  unilateral  or  multilateral.  Countries  may,
however, face adjustment cost in internationalizing their financial systems, including effects on
labor. They might consider committing through the FSA to a phased program of opening up over
some  agreed  time  frame  (possibly  complemented with  measures  which  could  smooth  the
transition  to  a more  open  environment).  Mexico committed  in the  context of  NAFTA  to a
phased  program of opening up over an agreed time frame, which included progressive market
capitalization  arrangements  which could modulate the growth  of foreign participation  in  the
sector in the event  of overly rapid foreign penetration.  In the NAFTA safeguards  were also
included in case "adverse" effects were to arise when the share of all commercial bank assets
held by foreign-owned banks exceeded certain threshold levels. 42 A commitment would provide
greater security for foreign financial firms of the environment under which they will operate and
thus could lead to a greater level of foreign participation in the financial sector.  It could also
reduce the  risk premium  charged by those  foreign institutions  which  will enter the  country,
which  in turn  would  lead to costs  savings for consumers.  And, it would  lend credibility to
countries' reform approaches, something which is at a premium today.  By themselves,  these
factors would help in overcoming the adjustment costs.
The FSA does not cover activities by central banks and governments in pursuit of monetary
policy or exchange rate policy and allows members to take any prudential measures, including
for  example,  the  imposition  of  limits  on  the  access  of  domestic  financial  institutions  to
international financial markets, as long as they are not used as a means to avoiding commitments
under the GATS.  Furthermore, the WTO-process explicitly includes mechanisms which  allow
temporary  suspension of commitments  in the  event of pronounced economic imbalances  (so
called prudential carve-out and balance of payments safeguard provisions).  These provisions
should  already  provide  the  flexibility  needed  for  governments  to  deal  with  any  adverse
consequences and no further safeguards appear necessary.
Countries should try to avoid the use of quantitative restrictions, a well-known  inefficient
form of regulation, but rather give consideration to converting them into price-based measures
(provided that their effect is equivalent in granting de facto national treatment and does not place
42  Specifically,  Mexico  could request  consultations  to limit  entry  and reduce  adverse  effects. Adverse  effects could
be associated  with threat  of control  of domestic  payments  or effects on the independence of Mexican monetary and
exchange rate policy.  In the end, these safeguards were not used and the foreign banks' share exceeded the original
threshold  levels in 1996.  In general, the  merit of including safeguards which  are triggered by adverse economic
events and conditioned on market shares may have limited value as it will be exactly in time of adverse economic
events that foreign  banks can be a stabilizing influence and when the country may want to open  up its financial
sector more.33
iforeign FSPs  at  a  competitive disadvantage  in  the  host  country  market).  Where  relevant,
countries should also try to harness the interests of foreign FSPs in entering the country.  This
can done as part of the process of the restructuring of the domestic financial system. In many
countries,  foreign  banks  are  assisting  in  the  restructuring  and  recapitalization  of  existing
institutions.  In  several  transition  economies,  for  example,  twinning  and  other  technical
assistance  arrangements with banks from developed countries is helping improve the level of
institutional development of individual financial institutions.
In  sum,  in  the  current environment especially,  there is  a  large premium  on a  credible,
consistent  financial  sector development  strategy.  The FSA  can help  countries  achieve  this
credibility, with built-in adequate safeguards.34
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Table 1. Integration of Financial Systems of Asia
(1995, except where noted)
Degree of Financial
Integration'  Private  Foreign  Foreign Share  Cross-Border
External  Bank Share 2'  of Capital  Financial Services in
1985 to  1992 to  Debt as  Market Activity  Insurance as Percent of
1987  1994  Percent of  (%)  GDP 3'
GDP
Indonesia  Medium  High  22.9%  0.35  75  0.22%04
South Korea  High  High  N/A  0.23  6  0.30%
Malaysia  High  High  24.0%  0.09  50  0.009%5/
Philippines  Medium - High  10.5%  0.46  50  0.23%
Singapore  N/A  N/A  N/A  0.29  N/A  1.63%
Thailand  Medium+  High  26.5%  0.08  34  0.63%
India  Medium  Medium+  3.4%  0.00  25  N/A
Sources:  Claessens,  Demirguc-Kunt and  Huizinga (1997), World Bank (1997), World Development  Indicators
(WDI, 1997), Global Development Finance (1997).
Notes:  1/  The index of  financial integration is based on country's  access to international financial markets, its
ability to attract private extemal financing, and the level of diversification of its financing (Source:  World
Bank, 1997).
2/  Ratio of number of reporting foreign banks to total number of reporting banks averaged over the period
1988 to 1995 (Source: Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1997).
3/  Defined as the sum of exports and imports of insurance services as a percentage of GDP (Source:  WDI,
1997).
4/  Imports only.
5/  Exports only, 1994.42
Table 2. Derived Actual Operating Costs to Assets
(percentages, end 1995)
Derived  from  Actual  Reported 1 7
Aggregate  Margins
Hong Kong  1.734  1.40
Indonesia  -0.746  2.67
South Korea  2.013  2.24
Malaysia  0.568  1.37
Philippines 2 2.664  3.26
Singapore  N/A  1.26
Thailand 3/  2.998  1.79
Source:  various  other  data  sources.  The  derived  operating  cost  are calculated  by  adjusting  the  difference  between
aggregate  lending  and  deposit  rates  (as  reported  by the  respective  central  bank)  for  the  required  rate  of return  on
equity  capital  (set  at  15%),  the  effects  of  inflation  (actually  reported  for  1995).  the  effect  of  non-performing
loans  (as  reported  by  the  authorities  for  the  banking  system  for  1995),  and  reserve  requirements  (proxied  by the
actual  amount  of reserves  held  by the  banking  system  at the central  bank  as a fraction  of deposits).  The  residual
would  then  represent  the  intermediation  costs  if the  banking  system  behaved  according  to  the  model  as  capital
constrained,  optimizing  firms.  For  further  detail  on the model,  see  Montes-Negret  and Papi  (1996),
1/  "Actual  Reported"  operating  costs  to  assets  ratio  here  is  an average  of those  ratios  reported  by  both  foreign
and domestic  banks  (Source:  Demirguc-Kunt  and Huizinga,  1997)
2/  Applies  to  domestic  Philippine  banks  only
3/  Applies  to  domestic  Thai  banks  only43
Table 3. Performance Indicators of Banking Sector "
Years over which averaged  Net Interest Margin  Overhead/  Net Profit/
/Total Assets  Total Assets  Total Assets
Hong Kong  1990-1995  1.9  1.5  1.7
Indonesia  1988-1995  3.5  2.9  0.9
South Korea  1991-1995  1.7  2.1  0.4
Malaysia  1988-1995  2.4  1.6  0.9
Philippines  1988-1995  4.2  4.4  2.0
Singapore  1991-1995  1.9  1.3  1.1
Thailand  1988-1995  3.1  2.0  1.1
India  1992-1995  3.3  1.4  2.3
Comparators
Germany  1992-1995  1.9  2.1  0.4
Japan  1989-1995  1.4  1.1  0.2
U.S.  1988-1995  3.1  3.2  0.5
Source:  Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1997)
1/ Data presented are weighted averages of figures from all reporting banks, domestic and foreign.44
Table 4.  Performance  Indicators  of Securities Markets
(1995, unless otherwise noted)
Settlement  Safekeeping  Operational  GSCS  Cumulative  Impact of
Benchmark  Benchmark  Benchmark  Index 2'  Transaction  Cumulative Cost
Cost  (bps)  on Net  Return  (%)
Hong Kong  90.2  90.1  89.1  241.07  234.27  1.63
Indonesia  73.3  88.4  88.5  246.01  395.97  2.64
South Korea  82.7  91.0  94.1  90.32  322.80  50.05
Malaysia  80.8  90.8  92.4  185.22  337.63  3.81
Philippines  51.7  73.5  72.7  96.68  225.38  192.63
Singapore  83.3  87.4  91.1  177.72  269.24  3.35
Thailand  82.2  91.5  89.5  63.74  283.01  8.47
India  16.8  75.0  28.031  145.95  783.17  14.56
Source:  GSCS
1/ Benchmarks are average for 1995; GSCS and cumulative cost data as of June 1997.
2/  Alternative dates used as index base for India and Philippines (3/31/93 and 2/28195, respectively).
3/  Figure applies to 1994.45
Table 5. Performance Indicators of Life Insurance (1993).
Pay-back Ratio  Operating Expense/
Premium Income
Hong Kong  N/A  N/A
Indonesia  133.7  29.7
South Korea  101.8  15.0
Malaysia  93.9  43.5
Philippines  69.6  24.3
Singapore  88.5  32.9
Thailand  71.4  41.6
India  N/A  N/A
Source:  Eguchi (1995)46
Table 6.  Structure and Scope of Provision of Financial Services.
Hong Kong  Merchant banks  with restricted  licenses are the  only ones  allowed to engage  in
securities underwriting and trade.
India  Licensed  banks  are  allowed  to  participate  in  issues  of  securities,  including
underwriting and placement.
Indonesia  Commercial  banks  are  allowed  to  engage  only  in trust  and  foreign  exchange
activities  in addition to  deposit and  lending business (not clear  about  securities
business for banks).
South Korea  Only  securities  businesses  are  allowed  to  be  active  in  dealing,  broking,
underwriting,  securities  savings,  credit  granting.  (Only  representative  offices,
branches or joint  ventures of foreign securities companies who meet the minimum
paid-in capital requirement and have been in the securities business for  more than
5 years.)
Malaysia  Commercial banks can participate through subsidiaries in merchant banking, stock
broking, fund management, etc. (without need for separate dealers license).  Only
banks  in  Tier-I  status (well managed  and  capitalized) can  undertake  securities
borrowing and lending.
Merchant  banks  engage in underwriting and  portfolio management and  can also
take time deposits above a minimum amount and extend loans.
Philippines  Universal  banking authority granted to new and existing foreign bank  branches
(called expanded commercial banking authority).
Singapore  Participation in issues of securities through commercial banks and merchant banks
is allowed.  With regard to trading for own account or for account of customers,
commercial banks and merchant banks are required to set up separate subsidiaries.
Thailand  Participation in issues of securities, underwriting, asset management by banks are
allowed.
Source:  Various publications.47
Table 7. Market Structure in Banking and Insurance Sectors
Banking  Insurance
Share of
No. of Banks  No. of Branches  Market  State-Owned  No. of Companies
Concentration  Bank Assets'  (1993 data)
as of  Foreign/  Total  Foreign/  Total  No.  Share  (1994)  Foreign  Total
Joint  Joint  of  of CB  Insurer
banks  assets
Hong Kong  1995  154  185  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  0  N/A  N/A
Indonesia  1996  41  239  86  5919  72/  > 50%  48  0  140
South Korea  1995  9  40  N/A  N/A  6  65.7%3  13  5  50
Malaysia  1995  16  37  144  1433  6  59.4%4/  8  10  61
Philippines  1995  14  47  4  -3000  6  51.5%  N/A  12  126
Singapore  1993  22  35  347  90  N/A  N/A  0  52  141
Thailand  1996  14  29  14  3039  6  68.5%5  7  5  75
India  1996  23  65  N/A  62849  9  58.7%6/  79  0  2
Source: various
1/  Percentage  share  of assets. For India, 1993.
2/  These  are the 7 state banks (five state-owned  commercial  banks,  a former  development  bank, and a former  savings  bank);  as
of March  1994  they held 44% deposits  of banking  system  and 52%  total  credits,  50% of total banking  system  assets
3/  "Big 6" account  for 65.7%  of total South  Korean  commercial  banking  assets  (mkt. concentration  data  as of 8/95)
4/  Six largest  banks  account  for 59.4%  of total  commercial  banking  system  assets; > 80%  of domestic  bank assets
51 Six largest  banks  account  for 68.5%  of total  commercial  banking  system  assets; 74.8%  of domestic  bank assets
6/  These  nine are all state-owned  banks.48
Table 8. Indicators of Financial System Development
Credit of  Stock MStock  Mtock  Market  Bond Market  Bond Trading
Banking  Capitalization  Trading Value  Capitalization  Volume as %
System as % of  as % of GDP  as % of Market  as % of GDP  of Market
GDP  (1996)  Capitalization  (1994)  Capitalization
(1995)  (1996)  (1994)
Hong Kong  284.5  280.8  N/A  8 7  N/A
Indonesia  49.8  41.2  35.3  5 8  10
South Korea  69.9  25.4  127.7  24 1  43
Malaysia  131.9  315.5  56.5  56  32.6
Philippines  62.9  97.5  31.6  39.3  N/A
Singapore  76.2  169.0  42.81.  72.4  N/A
Thailand  136.5  54.0  44.4  13.7  4
India  23.9  35.1  21.7  33.9  9
Sources: World  Bank (1995, 1997),  IFC
'  1995 figure49
Table 9. Indicators of Institutional Framework
(mid-1997, unless otherwise indicated)
Bank  Bank  GS  Non-Performing Loans as
Regulatory  Supervision  Transparency  GS Fragility  CAMELOT  % of Total Loans
Framework  Quality  Score (O=best,  scores 1/  BIS  GS
24=worst)  (I  =best,  Reported  Estimated
I O=worst)  (1996)
Hong Kong  Very Good,  Good.  Very Good  8  3.5  2.9  < 2
Improvinig  Improving
Indonesia  Satisfactory,  Weak,  Satisfactory  15  4.6  10.4  17, state
Improving  Improving  5, private
South Korea  Weak,  Fair  Fair,  18  N/A  0.9  6
Improving  Improving
Malaysia  Satisfactory,  Weak,  Satisfactory  15  4.5  6.1  4
Improving  Improving
Philippines  Good  Fair  Satisfactory  13  3.7  N/A  < 3
Singapore  Very Good  Very Good  Poor  7  4.0  N/A  < I est.
Thailand  Weak,  Weak  Improving  22  5.2  7.7  > 15
Improving
India  Satisfactory.  Fair,  Fair,  11  5.8  19.5  < 13
Improving  improving  Improving
Source:  BIS (1997),  Goldman  Sachs (1997a  and 1997b)
1/  Goldman  Sachs  CAMELOT  Score  for  domestic  banks  only.  Weightings  for  calculation  of overall  score:  25%
for  asset  quality;  20%  for  management;  15%  for  capital  adequacy;  15%  for  earnings;  5%  for  liquidity;  15%  for
operating  environment;  5% for transparency.50
Table 10. Degree of Openness Indices
(1 most closed, 5 most open)
Banking  Securities  Insurance  Capital
Controls
Commitment  Practice  Commitment  Practice  Commitment  Practice  Practice
Hong Kong  4.20  4.75  4.00  4.40  4.40  4.00  4.80
Indonesia  3.15  3.20  3.50  3.00  3.10  2.60  3.60
South Korea  1.10  1.70  1.70  2.10  1.20  2.60  2.65
Malaysia  2.40  2.40  2.50  2.50  2.10  2.10  2.80
Philippines  2.80  3.35  2.40  2.40  2.90  2.80  2.45
Singapore  2.25  2.50  2.70  2.70  4.10  4.10  4.40
Thailand  2.95  2.85  2.00  2.00  2.80  2.80  4.20
India  2.70  2.25  2.50  2.10  1.00  1.00  1.50
Average  2.69  2.88  2.66  2.65  2.70  2.75  3.3051
Figure  1. Foreign  Participation  in the Banking Sector and Efficiency Measures
(1995)
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Figure 2: Foreign Participation in the Banking Sector and Efficiency Measures
(1995)
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Figure  3: Openness  and Institutional  Development and Fragility  Measures
for the Banking Sector
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Figure 4: Openness and Efficiency Measures of Securities Markets
(1995)
P?cicem  SeffenntBeIrmk  PThuce:  Opraicd lhank
100  1  00_
90 - 9  bi  t  ;7'  00
80.  so~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ad  v~a 4
~70  a  70
. 60  L60.1
m50  *Phffipn  50
;40.  40:
9  30 - 30.  Incia
20  20
10.  . ol
0  X  i  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __O  I_  _  _  _
1  1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5  4  4.5  1  1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5  4  45
Openness  Inicator(Pactice)  Openness  nckcator(Practice)
Source: See table 4.55
Figure  5: Openness  and Rate of Return  and  Cost Measures  for Securities Markets
(1995)
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Figure  6. Life-Insurance:  Openness  and Efficiency  Measures
(1993)
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Criteria:  The rankings refer to relative degree of openness only among the eight countries included in the
study as of the end of the Financial Services negotiations (mid-1995) or in practice as of end-1996.  The rating
may comprise one or a combination of features listed below.
A.  Establishment and ownership
5  No  limits  on  establishment  or  equity  acquisition/participation  in  domestic  banks/companies;
current practice of granting new licenses.
4  Foreign  branch  establishment(s) permitted  to  establish within  specific  limits; allowed foreign
equity participation in domestic banks/companies: 51% and up but less than 100%.
3  No new licenses granted in practice; entry limited to joint  ventures only; allowed foreign equity
participation in domestic banks/companies of  35 - 50%.
2  Allowed foreign equity participation in domestic banks/ companies of  15 - 34%.  Economic needs
test for foreign broker licenses.
I  Non-prudential  government approval required for establishment (minimum  limits on amount of
DFI,  "certain  criteria  eligibility");  allowed  foreign  equity  participation  in  domestic
banks/companies: above zero - 14%.
B.  Offices/ATMs
5  No branch offices nor ATM restrictions.
4  Restrictions  on  branches of  foreign company  but none  on joint  ventures;  partial removal  of
restrictions on additional branches.
3  Restrictions on branches of foreign company; more than 5 ATMs allowed.
2  Extremely tight restrictions on sub-branching; up to 5 offices/ATMs permitted subject to Branches
Act;  ban  on foreign branches from  establishing own ATM network; permission  from  national
ATM pool prior to setting-up ATM operations.
I  Non-prudential government approval required for all offices.
C.  Lending/activity
5  No limits on lending/business activity; in insurance, market share of 75% and up.
4  Foreign banks/companies not subjected to directed lending or m'andated  principal business activity
as domestic firms; in insurance, foreign share in domestic market of  61-75%.
3  Restrictions on computation of capital/lending limits or on issuance of securities; requirements on
paid-up capital (e.g., higher for FSPs); in insurance, foreign share in domestic market of 31-60%;
limits  for  issues of/trading  to  selected  securities only  or  for transactions  through  established
dealers.
2  Specified limits on offshore lending or lending of foreign branches; strict (non-capital) limits on
foreign companies vis-A-vis  domestic firms; in insurance, foreign share in domestic market of 11-
30%; limits on membership to the stock exchange.
I  Restrictions on management and operations such as mandatory lending, transactions only in local
currency,  ownership of real estate; in insurance, foreign share in domestic market of  I  - 10%;
restrictions  on  broking; securities trading  limited  to selected  firms;  limits on investment  trust
services to selected establishments; tight regulatory control.58
D.  Universal banking
5  No limits on financial services.
4  Some limits on financial activities or approval required.
3  Limits on activities of offices of foreign branches to deposit-taking.  Approval required for new
products.
2  Limits on foreign branch activities in foreign exchange, credit cards, trust services.
Restrictions on all activities normally undertaken by international banks with universal banking
rights.
E.  Residency requirement
5  No restrictions on composition of board membership; no residency requirement for membership
to stock exchange.
4  Restrictions on composition of board membership to at least one national.
3  Restrictions on board membership by foreigners according to proportion of ownership; residency
requirement for membership in the stock exchange: locally based CEO; limits on temporary stay
of executives.
2  Restrictions on board membership by foreigners to less than one half.
I  Restrictions on board membership by foreigners to one half or more.
F.  Cross-border trade
5  Free access to offshore financial instruments; no capital controls.
4  Free access allowed but solicitation or advertising by foreign institutions not permitted.
3  Access to instruments subject to annual limits or access to certain specified products in insurance;
registration for borrowing; permission required for participation in issues.
2  Limits on deposit acceptance, offshore borrowing/convertibility; minimum retention requirement
for domestic insurers; dealing/trading limited to certain foreign stock exchanges or IPOs limited to
residents; overseas investment for institutional investors allowed but subject to restrictions.
Controls on cross border supply of all financial services.Policy Research  Working Paper Series
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